Nota Kuliah undang-undang / Undang-undang keterangan yang masih ada dalam simpanan PG: Semuga semua mendapat menafaatnya.
Tahap pembuktian dan keterangan berdasarkan keadaan
( Standard of proof and Circumstantial Evidence ).
( Standard of proof and Circumstantial Evidence ).
1. Keterangan berdasarkan keadaan biasanya tidak ada saksi dan tidak ada keterangan terus (direct evidence ). Hanya berdasarkan keadaan persekitaran. Belum diputuskan samada tahap pembuktiannya samada “beyond reasonable doubt” (di luar keraguan munasabah) atau “ irresistible conclusion test” ( ujian kesimpulan yang tidak dapat sangkal).
2. Jika ujian kesimpulan kesangkalan dibuat maka tahap pembuktian adalah tinggi iaitu 100% tertuduh melakukan kesalahan dan mencapai kepastian.
3. Lord Denning dalam kes Miller V Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 AU ER 372 berkata
“darjah pembuktian adalah selesai. Ianya tidak perlu sampai kepastian, tetapi ianya hendaklah membawa darjah kemungkinan yang tinggi. Pembuktian di luar keraguan munasabah bukan bermaksud pembuktian di luar sebarang bayang keraguan ( Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt ). Undang-undang akan gagal melindungi masyarakat jika penerimaan berbagai kemungkinan diterima untuk mengelak proses keadilan.
4. Jika keterangan begitu kuat dan hanya tinggal kemungkinan kecil dan boleh dibuat dengan ayat “ tentunya ada kemungkinan, tetapi sangat kurang kemungkinan, maka kes telah terbukti di luar keraguan munasabah” ( of couse it possible,but not in the least probable ,the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt ).
5. Dalam kes Liew Kaling V PP [1960] 26 MLJ 306 –
“ujian yang selalu dipakai adalah orang yang waras menggunakan pemikirannya dalam kehidupan biasa manusia dan ini bukanlah seperti seorang ahli sains mencari kebenaran mutlak atau seorang guru agama mancari /menegak kebenaran emosi …”.
6. Dalam kes Mc Greevy V Director of Public Prosecutions [1973] 1 W.L.R 276 telah diputuskan dalam kes jenayah yang bergantung sepenohnya kepada keterangan berdasarkan keadaan , tahap pembuktian adalah di luar keraguan munasabah dan bukannya ujian kesimpulan tidak dapat di sangkal ( irresistible conclusion test).
7. Berbeza dengan kes Reg. v Hodge [1838] 2 Levin 277 di mana tuduhan dibuat kerana membunuh dan hakim telah menyatakan kepada juri, kes tersebut bukan sepenohnya bergantung kepada keterangan berdasarkan keadaan, oleh itu sebelum tetuduh didapati bersalah, juri mestilah berpuas hati keterangan berdasarkan keadaan adalah konsistant dengan perbuatan yang dilakukan dan berpuas hati dengan fakta-fakta yang tidak konsistant bahawa tertuduh tidak melakukan kesalahan.
8. Dua tahun kemudian kes di atas telah mendapat pertimbangan di Australia dalam kes Barca V The Queen [1975] 133 CLR 82 iaitu juri tidak boleh membuat keputusan bersalah jika keterangan berdasarkan keadaan tidak konsistant dengan kesalahan tertuduh (hypothesis other than guilt). Ini bermakna mahkamah Australia menolak untuk menerima kes Mc Greevy iaitu tahap pembuktian di luar keraguan munasabah dan lebih suka kepada ujian kesimpulan tidak dapat disangkal (irresistible conclusion test).
9. Pada tahun 1976 adalah giliran hakim di New Zealand melakukan pertimbangan pada kes Mc Greevy. Dalam kes Police V Pereira [ 1977] 1 NZLR 547 mahkamah merasakan untuk mengikut keputusan kes Reg. v Hodge [1838] dan menolak kes Mc Greevy. Komen dibuat
“sekiranya kes adalah gabungan keterangan terus dan keterangan berdasarkan keadaan maka tahap pembuktian adalah di luar keraguan munasabah”.
10. Walaupun kes Reg. v Hodge [1838] 2 Levin 277 tidak dirujuk di Mahkamah Malaysia dan Singgapore, tetapi terdapat kecenderungan mahkamah di Malaysia menggunakan tahap yang lebih tinggi dari di luar keraguan munasabah pada kes keterangan berdasarkan keadaan. Beberapa kes menunjukkan mahkamah meletakkan beban yang lebih berat kepada pendakwa dalam hal keterangan berdasarkan keadaan.
11. Di Singgapura kes Karter Singh and Anor V Rex [1952] MLJ 85 rayuan telah dibuat atas sabitan bunuh tidak sengaja. Rayuan dibenarkan oleh kerana pembuktian tidak mancapai tahap tinggi dalam kes keterangan berdasarkan keadaan seperti yang diperlukan.
12. Tahap tinggi pembuktian di Malaysia dalam kes keterangan berdasarkan keadaan ditimbang pada kes Idris V PP [1960] MLJ 296 di mana perayu telah disabitkan salah atas kesalahan membunuh bekas isterinya. – kecuali keterangan mengenai motif, kes pendakwa bergantung sepenohnya kepada keterangan berdasarkan keadaan. Mahkamah ingin memberikan definisi keterangan berdasarkan keadaan merujuk kepada kes Belhaven & Stenten Peerage [1875- 76] Appeal case 279
“dalam mengendalikan keterangan berdasarkan keadaan kita hendaklah menimbangkan beratnya (weight) kuasa percantuman (united force) semua keterangan berdasarkan keadaan apabila digabungkan bersama. Anda mungkin ada satu pancaran cahaya yang lemah dan dengan sendirinya tidak boleh menerangi satu sudut. Tetapi sekiranya anda ada beberapa sinaran cahaya yang lemah di gabungkan pada satu sudut ianya akan menghilangkan kegelapan. Dengan perkataan lain keterangan berdasarkan keadaan terdiri dari berikut : Apabila dilihat keadaan sekeliling anda akan dapati siri tanda-tanda dialamnya (series of under signed) di mana seorang yang berakal biasa terpaksa membuat satu keputusan kesimpulan. Jika keterangan berdasarkan keadaan tidak dapat memuaskan ujian tahap tersebut, maka ia akan meniggalkan jurang (gap) dan tidak berguna langsung”.
13. Chan Chwen King V PP [1962] MLJ 307 – perayu telah disabit dengan kesalahan membunuh seorang perempuan dan anaknya. Thomson C.J dalam memberi penghakimannya berkata
‘
“keterangan bergantung sepenohnya kepada keterangan berdasarkan keadaan dan apa yang dikritik adalah terjumlah seperti berikut – tidak ada satupun cebisan keterangan berkenaan cukup kuat untuk memberi sabitan.Ini adalah sangat benar. Ia mestilah di ingati ,dalam kes melibatkan keseluruhannya melibatkan keterangan berdasarkan keadaan,Ini adalah sangat benar. Ia mestilah di ingati ,dalam kes melibatkan keseluruhannya melibatkan keterangan berdasarkan keadaan,pertimbangan bukan saja dibuat pada kekuatan setiap cebisan keterangan tetapi kekuatan kombinasi cebisan keterangan-keterangan berkenaan dan apabila dipulas (twisted) bersama untuk membentuk satu tali. Soalan sebenarnya : Adakah tali tersebut cukup kuat untuk menggantung banduan?
14. Cabutan teks.
Facts:
The appellant was convicted for the murder of a woman and her child and was sentenced to death. It was argued on appeal that : (i) the evidence was entirely circumstantial; (ii) the trial judge dealt withthe need for corroboration of the evidence of the child witnesses unsatisfactorily; (iii) the trial judge misdirected the jury by suggesting to that the evidence of the defence is to be regarded and evaluated in isolation and that if that fails to come up to some standard proof is to be discarded.
Holdings:
Held:
(1) in cases where the evidence is wholly circumstantial, what has to be considered is not only the strength of each individual strand of evidence but also the combined strength of these strands when twisted together to make a rope;
(2) although the trial judge did not administer the necessary caution to the jury as suggested in Chao Chong v Public Prosecutor [1960] MLJ 238 nevertheless the Court was not prepared to say that the terms in which he did administer the caution was wrong;
(3) the suggestion of the learned trial judge that the evidence for the defence is to be evaluated in isolation and that if it fails to come up to some standard proof it is to be discarded is beyond the authorities. However in this case if the jury had been properly directed they would have inevitably come to the conclusion that the prisoner was guilty of both murders and therefore the case was one which came within the scope of s (29)(2) of the Court Ordinance, 1948, and the appeal should be dismissed.
15. Dalam kes di Singgapura Sunny Ang V PP [1966] 1 MLJ 95 hakim berkata
“soalan yang perlu diberi perhatian, kes ini bergantung kepada keterangan berdasarkan keadaan dan adakah kesan menaik/meningkat (cumulative effect) keterangan berkenaan akan membawa anda membuat satu kesimpulan yang tidak dapat disangkal iaitu tertuduh melakukan jenayah atau adakah terdapat penjelasan munasabah contohnya adakah ianya satu kemalangan?.Hakim seterusnya menyatakan keterangan berdasarkan keadaan adalah kesan menaik dengan mengumpul semua mereka bersama dan dari itu adakah membawa anda satu kesimpulan inferen yang tidak dapat disangkal bahawa tertuduh yang melakukan jenayah. Atau adakah sebarang penjelasan munasabah lain ke atas fakta tesebut (bagaimana mangsa dibunuh). Kes pendakwa adalah kesan semua keterangan yang membawa anda tidak dapat menyangkal (irresistible) atau mengalah (inexorably) untuk membuat satu kesimpulan dan satu kesimpulan saja : bahawa tertuduh yang dengan sengaja menyebab kematian kepada perempuan muda ini.
16. Cabutan teks.
Facts:
The appellant in this case was convicted for the murder of one Jenny Cheok Cheng Kid and was sentenced to death. According to the prosecution the offence was committed at sea near two islands off Singapore. The appellant had hired a sampan from a boatman and on his directions the boatman brought the appellant and the girl to a place near the two islands where he dropped anchor. According to the appellant his object in going there was to collect corals; the prosecution contended that his real intention was to murder the girl, and that in pursuance of that intention he assisted her to put on the diving equipment and allowed her, a novice diver, to go down alone, wearing a flipper, which had been previously cut, in waters which he knew were dangerous and hazardous, with the result that she met her death. Evidence was given that the girl had been insured against accidents with several insurance companies; and that some of the policies had been renewed by the appellant on the morning of the girl’s death, although he had not renewed or extended his own insurance policy. The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence and on the cumulative effect of such evidence. On appeal a number of grounds were relied on and it was alleged inter alia (1) that the learned trial judge had erred in law in failing to direct the jury on a possible verdict of culpable homicide not amounting to murder; (2) that the learned trial judge erred in law in permitting the prosecution to abuse the provisions of s 192(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code by adducing the evidence of witnesses who had not been called at the preliminary inquiry after giving only a few minutes’ notice of the intention to call such witnesses; (3) that the trial judge erred in law in permitting the prosecution to adduce evidence of attempts to suborn the boatman; (4) that the trial judge was prejudiced and biased against the appellant; (5) that the trial judge erred in law in failing adequately to direct the jury on the danger of convicting an ac cused person upon circumstantial evidence.
Holdings:
Held, dismissing the appeal:
(1) Having regard to the facts and circumstances in this case, the case was one in which the appellant was either guilty of murder or not guilty of any offence whatsoever and it was unnecessary for the trial judge to direct the jury on a possible verdict of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
(2) As no time limit is prescribed by s 192(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code the prosecution had technically complied with the provisions of the section and were at liberty to call the witnesses but as a matter of practice every effort should be made by the prosecution to serve the necessary notice and documents as soon as possible after it is known that a person who has not given evidence at a preliminary inquiry has to be called as a witness for the prosecution.
(3) The evidence of subornation of the witness was not objected to at the trial by counsel for the appellant, who had in fact wanted the evidence in, and therefore the appellant could not complain against the admission of the evidence.
(4) While it was true that the trial judge expressed himself with great emphasis and in strong terms on various matters, the jury were left in no doubt that they were the sole judges of the facts in the case and there was no substance in the grounds that the judge was biased and prejudiced against the appellant.
(5) The directions of the trial judge on the effect and in particular the cumulative effect of circumstantial evidence were perfectly adequate.
(6) Although the body of the deceased was never found, there was overwhelming evidence on the record that the appellant murdered her.
[Editorial Note: The appellant sought special leave to appeal against his conviction to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The Judicial Committee refused leave on 4 October 1966.]
17. Tahap pembuktian tinggi sekali lagi dapat dilihat dalam kes Muniandy V PP [1973] 1 MLJ 179. Perayu telah dituduh dengan rogol.
“Hanya keterangan berdasarkan keadaan yang dapat menyokong keterangan mangsa. Hakim Ong C.J membuat penghakiman di mahkamah persekutuan yang membenarkan rayuan berkata
“apabila pendakwa hanya bergantung kepada keterangan berdasarkan keadaan untuk membina kesnya terhadap tertuduh, setiap cebisan keterangan mestilah menuju satu arah saja iaitu mencadang atau memberi sokongan satu inferen kesalahan (guilt)”.
Cabutan teks.
Facts:
This was an appeal against the conviction of the appellant on a charge of rape. The prosecution rested mainly and solely on the evidence of the child-complainant. Ther was no corroboration of her evidence. A witness was called for the defence and asked whether he had sexual intercourse with the complainant but the provisions of s 132(2) of the Evidence Ordinance was not explained to the witness.
Holdings:
Held:
(1) the complainant’s evidence by itself was far from convincing and there was a total absence of corroboration in any material particular implicating either of the appellants. On the contrary the complainant’s evidence was discredited by her own father;
(2) the defence case was not properly and fairly presented to the jury;
(3) the failure of the learned judge to comply with the provisions of s 132 of the Evidence Ordinance resulted in serious misdirections;
(4) on all these grounds, the appeal must be allowed and the conviction of the appellants quashed.
18. Eng Sin v PP [1974] 2 MLJ 168 dan Khamis V PP [1975] 1 MLJ 46 -tuduhan adalah bunuh dan tidak ada keterangan terus (direct evidence). –
Untuk mahkamah bergantung kepada keterangan berdasarkan keadaan, keterangan yang ditimbangkan mestilah hanyalah menunjuk kepada satu butiran iaitu kesalahan tertuduh, ia tidak boleh berupaya kepada sebarang interpretasi lain atau sebarang makna lain ( kes ini bergantung kepada ujian kesimpulan tidak dapat disangkal -irrisistable conclusion test ).
19. Cabutan teks.
Facts:
In this case the appellant had been convicted of murder of a girl aged 11 years. The evidence against the appellant was entirely circumstantial. In his summing up the learned trial judge had explained all the facts of the case and laid emphasis on the evidence of appellant. He also said that for a court to rely on circumstantial evidence the evidence when considered must point only to the guilt of the accused; it must not be capable of any other interpretation or any other meaning.
Holdings:
Held in this case, in the light of the evidence, and taking the summing up as a whole it was impossible for the court to say that there had been a miscarriage of justice and therefore the appeal must be dismissed.[Editorial Note: See “McGreevy v DPP Revisited” [1974] 2 MLJ xxxiii.]
20. Tahap ini juga diguna dalam kes Dato Mokhtar Hashim & Anor V PP [1983] 2 MLJ 232.
Penerimaan kes Mc Greevy pada tahap rendah.
Pada tahun 1982 Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menggunakan prinsip dalam kes Mc Greevy. Ini berlaku dalam kes Jayaraman & Ors V PP [1982] 2 MLJ 273 apabila hakim Syed Othman berkata
“ Saya cukup sedar fomula “irresistible” yang digunakan oleh mahkamah di Malaysia dalam mengendalikan kes keterangan berdasarkan keadaan …. Dalam kes sekarang ianya hanyalah pemainan perkataan iaitu kedua-dua ujian adalah sama (Mc Greevy dan Reg. v Hodge ). Jika fakta terbukti alternatif kepada kesalahan tertuduh, atau dengan perkataan lain terdapat keraguan kepada kes pendakwa dan pendakwa dikatakan tidak membuktikan kesnya di luar keraguan munsabah. Dalam kes ini fakta yang dibukti tidak menunjuk kepada kesalahan tertuduh dan mahkamah yang melakukan pembicaraan tidak pasti akan kesalahan tertuduh dan mestilah membuang kes pendakwa oleh kerana tidak dapat membuktikan kesnya di luar sebarang keraguan munasabah. Dalam kes keterangan berdasarkan keadaan adalah mengcukupi jika mahkamah hanya menyatakan ia berpuas hati dengan kesalahan tertuduh (guilt of accused) di luar keraguan munasabah tanpa berkata lanjut fakta terbukti tidak dapat disangkal (irresistible) kepada satu butiran dan hanya satu kesimpulan iaitu tertuduh bersalah.
21. Mahkamah persekutuan membuat kesimpulan perkataan yang dinamakan “irresistible” hanyalah satu cara lain untuk menyatakan terbukti di luar sebarang keraguan munasabah (proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
Nota : terdapat keputusan kemudianya mahkamah telah merujuk kepada “ irrisistable conclusion test” (ujian kesimpulan yang tidak dapat disangkal ).
22. Cabutan teks
Facts:
This was an appeal against the decision of the learned President, Sessions Court, Kelang, convicting the appellants for causing the death of the four deceased persons under s 304 read in conjunction with s 34 of the Penal Code. The appeal raised a number of question of facts and law.
Holdings:
Held: (1) the appeal against the grounds of judgment in this case dealt too much on findings of fact rather than on substantial points of law. The appellate court has not hot had the advantage of seeing or hearing the witness and unless it could be shown that the trial court had misused its advantage, it was not for the appellate court to reverse the trial court’s findings. In this case not one of the numerous points alleging misdirection of facts taken alone or all those taken together could justify the appellate court of interfere with the findings of the trial court;
(2) as the earlier discharge of the accused did not amount to an acquittal the plea of autrefois acquit could not stand.
(3) in the circumstances of this case the prosecution was under no obligation to supply statements of their witness to the defence. The defence is only entitled to the police statement when a prosecution witness is to be impeached;
(4) whether or not there is an arrest is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court and in this case the learned President was right in holding that the Police Corporal was not making an arrest when he told the appellants not to leave the temple compound;
(5) the statement made by the appellant to the Police Corporal when he arrived at the scene were not admissible in evidence but the statements made to the Police Inspector were admissible as they were made to him before arrest;
(6) there was no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court that Inspector Govindan who recorded cautioned statements from the appellants, was competent in Tamil, that the words he used in the caution statements have the same effect as required by the Criminal Procedure Code and that the statements were recorded within the time stated in them. The cautioned statements were therefore rightly held to be admissible in evidence.
(7) in dealing with a case which relies on circumstantial evidence it is sufficient if the court makes a finding that in considering all the evidence it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the offence. In any case the learned President in his judgment came to the “inescapable conclusion” that the appellant were expert fighters, which is the same as “irresistible conclusion”;
(8) on the evidence the trial court formed the inescapable conclusion that the appellant were expert fighters. Considering the number of persons dead, four, and one badly injured on the grounds of the temple and the weapons used by the appellants, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that all the appellants must have participated in the fight;
(9) in this case the deceased persons died of very severe injuries and from the evidence the learned President was entitled to form his opinion as to the nature of the weapons which had been used to inflict the injuries. It did not take an expert to determine whether the injuries could or could not cause the death or what weapon was used to cause the injuries. These are question of fact and the trial court was in as good a position as the expert to determine the questions;
(10) from the injuries suffered only by two of the appellants the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the deceased persons offered hardly any resistance when they were attacked. With the instruments they had and having been surrounded by the appellants they were in no position to attack. The appellants had superior weapons and showed no mercy towards the deceased persons. All the evidence pointed to the conclusion that the appellants were all acting in concert and had the intention to kill from the outset. On the evidence the defence of self defence could not have considered;
(11) the finding of guilt against all the appellants must therefore be upheld. Although the sentences imposed were on the lenient side, they would not, in the special circumstances of the case, be disturbed.
Editorial Note : On Appeal, the above decision was affirmed by Federal Court on 10 June 1982.
23. Mahkamah Agong dalam kes Ng thian Soong V PP [1990] 2 MLJ 148 - mahkamah telah menggunakan formula kes Mc Greevy.
24. Beban bukti kes pendakwa samada dalam kes keterangan terus (direct evidence) atau keterangan berdasarkan keadaan adalah sama iaitu di luar sebarang keraguan munasabah.
25. Cabutan teks.
Facts:
The appellant had been tried by jury and found guilty of murder by a majority verdict of five to two and he was convicted and sentenced to death. On his appeal, three major arguments were raised and considered: (a) at the trial, after the jury had retired to consider their verdict at 5.57 pm, the foreman informed the judge at 8.08pm that the jury had come to a four to three decision whereupon the learned judge asked the jury to retire again for further consideration. It was only after the jury had retired for the second time that they returned a verdict of guilty of murder of a majority of five to two to which the learned judge concurred. It was argued that since the jury had already decided by a majority of four to three in the first instance, they became functus officio and as such the verdict by which the accused was found guilty was a nullity. It was also alleged in the petition of appeal that the learned judge had pressured the jury to come to a verdict by telling them they would have to stay the whole night until a verdict was reached; (b) the direction given to the jury on the subject of circumstantial evidence to connect the accused with the crime of murder was inadequate or insufficient; (c) the learned judge was wrong in ruling that the evidence of bare denial by the accused should be on the ground that it constituted a defence of alibi and therefore was not admissible in the absence of notice served on the prosecution under s 402A of the Criminal Procedure Code (FMS Cap 6) (‘CPC’).
Holdings:
Held, allowing the appeal of the accused:
(1) Since s 204(ii) of the CPC expressly requires that a majority verdict of the jury must not be less than five to two anything less cannot constitute a verdict in law. Accordingly, when the jury had indicated that they had reached a decision by a majority of four to three, the learned judge was perfectly entitled to resolve the deadlock by requiring them to retire for further consideration under s 228 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The functus officio argument is therefore wholly without substance.
(2) The procedure adopted by the learned judge in this case was in fact the practice recommended in Lee Koh Eng v PP [1975] 1 MLJ 132 (refd) and adopted ever since in the High Courts to avoid the very functus officio argument which was canvassed in this case.
(3) There is no merit in the complaint that the learned judge had directed the jury to reconsider their verdict at 8.08pm and indicated that they would have to stay the whole night until a verdict was reached. After the summing up in this case, it would be most undesirable to allow the jury to go home and to reconvene the next day for the verdict.
(4) In a case of the present nature where the strands of circumstantial evidence connecting the accused with the crime are capable of more than on inference, it is not sufficient for the trial judge merely to tabulate the indirect evidence. He must go one step further by directing the jury as to what other reasonable inferences could be drawn from each strand of circumstantial evidence and leaving it to the jury to decide which inference they wish to adopt. It is only when the combined strength of these inferences accepted by the jury when twisted together is strong enough to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt that a finding could be arrived at the guilt of the accused.
(5) The summing up of the learned trial judge on circumstantial evidence was manifestly inadequate so as to constitute a misdirection which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice in the circumstances of the particular case.
(6) The evidence excluded by the learned judge merely amounted to a bare denial and such evidence ought not to have been expunged. To deny the accused from putting his defence to the jury, however implausible it may appear, would most certainly occasion a miscarriage of justice particularly having regard to the weak nature of the prosecution’s case.
26. Walaupun terdapat keputusan dalam kes Ng Thian Soon perkara “ irresistible conclusion test” masih menghantui mahkamah agong melalui kes PP v Lim Lian Chen [1992] 4 CLJ 2086 pada pertuduhan mengedar dadah.
27. Apabila keterangan bergantung kepada keterangan berdasarkan keadaan beban bukti adalah sangat berat dan keterangan tidak dapat disangkal (irresistible ) mestilah menunjukkan kesalahan tertuduh. Jika terdapat satu gap (jurang) didalamnya maka ianya tidak mengcukupi untuk membukti kes terhadap tertuduh. Keterangan berdasarkan keadaan di mana perayu dicam oleh saksi sebelum itu adalah tidak cukup kuat kepada “ujian kesimpulan tidak dapat disangkal” bahawa tertuduh yang melakukan kesalahan.
28. Oleh kerana kes tersebut tidak mencapai tahap yang dikehendaki, sabitan diketepikan.
2. Jika ujian kesimpulan kesangkalan dibuat maka tahap pembuktian adalah tinggi iaitu 100% tertuduh melakukan kesalahan dan mencapai kepastian.
3. Lord Denning dalam kes Miller V Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 AU ER 372 berkata
“darjah pembuktian adalah selesai. Ianya tidak perlu sampai kepastian, tetapi ianya hendaklah membawa darjah kemungkinan yang tinggi. Pembuktian di luar keraguan munasabah bukan bermaksud pembuktian di luar sebarang bayang keraguan ( Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt ). Undang-undang akan gagal melindungi masyarakat jika penerimaan berbagai kemungkinan diterima untuk mengelak proses keadilan.
4. Jika keterangan begitu kuat dan hanya tinggal kemungkinan kecil dan boleh dibuat dengan ayat “ tentunya ada kemungkinan, tetapi sangat kurang kemungkinan, maka kes telah terbukti di luar keraguan munasabah” ( of couse it possible,but not in the least probable ,the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt ).
5. Dalam kes Liew Kaling V PP [1960] 26 MLJ 306 –
“ujian yang selalu dipakai adalah orang yang waras menggunakan pemikirannya dalam kehidupan biasa manusia dan ini bukanlah seperti seorang ahli sains mencari kebenaran mutlak atau seorang guru agama mancari /menegak kebenaran emosi …”.
6. Dalam kes Mc Greevy V Director of Public Prosecutions [1973] 1 W.L.R 276 telah diputuskan dalam kes jenayah yang bergantung sepenohnya kepada keterangan berdasarkan keadaan , tahap pembuktian adalah di luar keraguan munasabah dan bukannya ujian kesimpulan tidak dapat di sangkal ( irresistible conclusion test).
7. Berbeza dengan kes Reg. v Hodge [1838] 2 Levin 277 di mana tuduhan dibuat kerana membunuh dan hakim telah menyatakan kepada juri, kes tersebut bukan sepenohnya bergantung kepada keterangan berdasarkan keadaan, oleh itu sebelum tetuduh didapati bersalah, juri mestilah berpuas hati keterangan berdasarkan keadaan adalah konsistant dengan perbuatan yang dilakukan dan berpuas hati dengan fakta-fakta yang tidak konsistant bahawa tertuduh tidak melakukan kesalahan.
8. Dua tahun kemudian kes di atas telah mendapat pertimbangan di Australia dalam kes Barca V The Queen [1975] 133 CLR 82 iaitu juri tidak boleh membuat keputusan bersalah jika keterangan berdasarkan keadaan tidak konsistant dengan kesalahan tertuduh (hypothesis other than guilt). Ini bermakna mahkamah Australia menolak untuk menerima kes Mc Greevy iaitu tahap pembuktian di luar keraguan munasabah dan lebih suka kepada ujian kesimpulan tidak dapat disangkal (irresistible conclusion test).
9. Pada tahun 1976 adalah giliran hakim di New Zealand melakukan pertimbangan pada kes Mc Greevy. Dalam kes Police V Pereira [ 1977] 1 NZLR 547 mahkamah merasakan untuk mengikut keputusan kes Reg. v Hodge [1838] dan menolak kes Mc Greevy. Komen dibuat
“sekiranya kes adalah gabungan keterangan terus dan keterangan berdasarkan keadaan maka tahap pembuktian adalah di luar keraguan munasabah”.
10. Walaupun kes Reg. v Hodge [1838] 2 Levin 277 tidak dirujuk di Mahkamah Malaysia dan Singgapore, tetapi terdapat kecenderungan mahkamah di Malaysia menggunakan tahap yang lebih tinggi dari di luar keraguan munasabah pada kes keterangan berdasarkan keadaan. Beberapa kes menunjukkan mahkamah meletakkan beban yang lebih berat kepada pendakwa dalam hal keterangan berdasarkan keadaan.
11. Di Singgapura kes Karter Singh and Anor V Rex [1952] MLJ 85 rayuan telah dibuat atas sabitan bunuh tidak sengaja. Rayuan dibenarkan oleh kerana pembuktian tidak mancapai tahap tinggi dalam kes keterangan berdasarkan keadaan seperti yang diperlukan.
12. Tahap tinggi pembuktian di Malaysia dalam kes keterangan berdasarkan keadaan ditimbang pada kes Idris V PP [1960] MLJ 296 di mana perayu telah disabitkan salah atas kesalahan membunuh bekas isterinya. – kecuali keterangan mengenai motif, kes pendakwa bergantung sepenohnya kepada keterangan berdasarkan keadaan. Mahkamah ingin memberikan definisi keterangan berdasarkan keadaan merujuk kepada kes Belhaven & Stenten Peerage [1875- 76] Appeal case 279
“dalam mengendalikan keterangan berdasarkan keadaan kita hendaklah menimbangkan beratnya (weight) kuasa percantuman (united force) semua keterangan berdasarkan keadaan apabila digabungkan bersama. Anda mungkin ada satu pancaran cahaya yang lemah dan dengan sendirinya tidak boleh menerangi satu sudut. Tetapi sekiranya anda ada beberapa sinaran cahaya yang lemah di gabungkan pada satu sudut ianya akan menghilangkan kegelapan. Dengan perkataan lain keterangan berdasarkan keadaan terdiri dari berikut : Apabila dilihat keadaan sekeliling anda akan dapati siri tanda-tanda dialamnya (series of under signed) di mana seorang yang berakal biasa terpaksa membuat satu keputusan kesimpulan. Jika keterangan berdasarkan keadaan tidak dapat memuaskan ujian tahap tersebut, maka ia akan meniggalkan jurang (gap) dan tidak berguna langsung”.
13. Chan Chwen King V PP [1962] MLJ 307 – perayu telah disabit dengan kesalahan membunuh seorang perempuan dan anaknya. Thomson C.J dalam memberi penghakimannya berkata
‘
“keterangan bergantung sepenohnya kepada keterangan berdasarkan keadaan dan apa yang dikritik adalah terjumlah seperti berikut – tidak ada satupun cebisan keterangan berkenaan cukup kuat untuk memberi sabitan.Ini adalah sangat benar. Ia mestilah di ingati ,dalam kes melibatkan keseluruhannya melibatkan keterangan berdasarkan keadaan,Ini adalah sangat benar. Ia mestilah di ingati ,dalam kes melibatkan keseluruhannya melibatkan keterangan berdasarkan keadaan,pertimbangan bukan saja dibuat pada kekuatan setiap cebisan keterangan tetapi kekuatan kombinasi cebisan keterangan-keterangan berkenaan dan apabila dipulas (twisted) bersama untuk membentuk satu tali. Soalan sebenarnya : Adakah tali tersebut cukup kuat untuk menggantung banduan?
14. Cabutan teks.
Facts:
The appellant was convicted for the murder of a woman and her child and was sentenced to death. It was argued on appeal that : (i) the evidence was entirely circumstantial; (ii) the trial judge dealt withthe need for corroboration of the evidence of the child witnesses unsatisfactorily; (iii) the trial judge misdirected the jury by suggesting to that the evidence of the defence is to be regarded and evaluated in isolation and that if that fails to come up to some standard proof is to be discarded.
Holdings:
Held:
(1) in cases where the evidence is wholly circumstantial, what has to be considered is not only the strength of each individual strand of evidence but also the combined strength of these strands when twisted together to make a rope;
(2) although the trial judge did not administer the necessary caution to the jury as suggested in Chao Chong v Public Prosecutor [1960] MLJ 238 nevertheless the Court was not prepared to say that the terms in which he did administer the caution was wrong;
(3) the suggestion of the learned trial judge that the evidence for the defence is to be evaluated in isolation and that if it fails to come up to some standard proof it is to be discarded is beyond the authorities. However in this case if the jury had been properly directed they would have inevitably come to the conclusion that the prisoner was guilty of both murders and therefore the case was one which came within the scope of s (29)(2) of the Court Ordinance, 1948, and the appeal should be dismissed.
15. Dalam kes di Singgapura Sunny Ang V PP [1966] 1 MLJ 95 hakim berkata
“soalan yang perlu diberi perhatian, kes ini bergantung kepada keterangan berdasarkan keadaan dan adakah kesan menaik/meningkat (cumulative effect) keterangan berkenaan akan membawa anda membuat satu kesimpulan yang tidak dapat disangkal iaitu tertuduh melakukan jenayah atau adakah terdapat penjelasan munasabah contohnya adakah ianya satu kemalangan?.Hakim seterusnya menyatakan keterangan berdasarkan keadaan adalah kesan menaik dengan mengumpul semua mereka bersama dan dari itu adakah membawa anda satu kesimpulan inferen yang tidak dapat disangkal bahawa tertuduh yang melakukan jenayah. Atau adakah sebarang penjelasan munasabah lain ke atas fakta tesebut (bagaimana mangsa dibunuh). Kes pendakwa adalah kesan semua keterangan yang membawa anda tidak dapat menyangkal (irresistible) atau mengalah (inexorably) untuk membuat satu kesimpulan dan satu kesimpulan saja : bahawa tertuduh yang dengan sengaja menyebab kematian kepada perempuan muda ini.
16. Cabutan teks.
Facts:
The appellant in this case was convicted for the murder of one Jenny Cheok Cheng Kid and was sentenced to death. According to the prosecution the offence was committed at sea near two islands off Singapore. The appellant had hired a sampan from a boatman and on his directions the boatman brought the appellant and the girl to a place near the two islands where he dropped anchor. According to the appellant his object in going there was to collect corals; the prosecution contended that his real intention was to murder the girl, and that in pursuance of that intention he assisted her to put on the diving equipment and allowed her, a novice diver, to go down alone, wearing a flipper, which had been previously cut, in waters which he knew were dangerous and hazardous, with the result that she met her death. Evidence was given that the girl had been insured against accidents with several insurance companies; and that some of the policies had been renewed by the appellant on the morning of the girl’s death, although he had not renewed or extended his own insurance policy. The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence and on the cumulative effect of such evidence. On appeal a number of grounds were relied on and it was alleged inter alia (1) that the learned trial judge had erred in law in failing to direct the jury on a possible verdict of culpable homicide not amounting to murder; (2) that the learned trial judge erred in law in permitting the prosecution to abuse the provisions of s 192(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code by adducing the evidence of witnesses who had not been called at the preliminary inquiry after giving only a few minutes’ notice of the intention to call such witnesses; (3) that the trial judge erred in law in permitting the prosecution to adduce evidence of attempts to suborn the boatman; (4) that the trial judge was prejudiced and biased against the appellant; (5) that the trial judge erred in law in failing adequately to direct the jury on the danger of convicting an ac cused person upon circumstantial evidence.
Holdings:
Held, dismissing the appeal:
(1) Having regard to the facts and circumstances in this case, the case was one in which the appellant was either guilty of murder or not guilty of any offence whatsoever and it was unnecessary for the trial judge to direct the jury on a possible verdict of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
(2) As no time limit is prescribed by s 192(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code the prosecution had technically complied with the provisions of the section and were at liberty to call the witnesses but as a matter of practice every effort should be made by the prosecution to serve the necessary notice and documents as soon as possible after it is known that a person who has not given evidence at a preliminary inquiry has to be called as a witness for the prosecution.
(3) The evidence of subornation of the witness was not objected to at the trial by counsel for the appellant, who had in fact wanted the evidence in, and therefore the appellant could not complain against the admission of the evidence.
(4) While it was true that the trial judge expressed himself with great emphasis and in strong terms on various matters, the jury were left in no doubt that they were the sole judges of the facts in the case and there was no substance in the grounds that the judge was biased and prejudiced against the appellant.
(5) The directions of the trial judge on the effect and in particular the cumulative effect of circumstantial evidence were perfectly adequate.
(6) Although the body of the deceased was never found, there was overwhelming evidence on the record that the appellant murdered her.
[Editorial Note: The appellant sought special leave to appeal against his conviction to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The Judicial Committee refused leave on 4 October 1966.]
17. Tahap pembuktian tinggi sekali lagi dapat dilihat dalam kes Muniandy V PP [1973] 1 MLJ 179. Perayu telah dituduh dengan rogol.
“Hanya keterangan berdasarkan keadaan yang dapat menyokong keterangan mangsa. Hakim Ong C.J membuat penghakiman di mahkamah persekutuan yang membenarkan rayuan berkata
“apabila pendakwa hanya bergantung kepada keterangan berdasarkan keadaan untuk membina kesnya terhadap tertuduh, setiap cebisan keterangan mestilah menuju satu arah saja iaitu mencadang atau memberi sokongan satu inferen kesalahan (guilt)”.
Cabutan teks.
Facts:
This was an appeal against the conviction of the appellant on a charge of rape. The prosecution rested mainly and solely on the evidence of the child-complainant. Ther was no corroboration of her evidence. A witness was called for the defence and asked whether he had sexual intercourse with the complainant but the provisions of s 132(2) of the Evidence Ordinance was not explained to the witness.
Holdings:
Held:
(1) the complainant’s evidence by itself was far from convincing and there was a total absence of corroboration in any material particular implicating either of the appellants. On the contrary the complainant’s evidence was discredited by her own father;
(2) the defence case was not properly and fairly presented to the jury;
(3) the failure of the learned judge to comply with the provisions of s 132 of the Evidence Ordinance resulted in serious misdirections;
(4) on all these grounds, the appeal must be allowed and the conviction of the appellants quashed.
18. Eng Sin v PP [1974] 2 MLJ 168 dan Khamis V PP [1975] 1 MLJ 46 -tuduhan adalah bunuh dan tidak ada keterangan terus (direct evidence). –
Untuk mahkamah bergantung kepada keterangan berdasarkan keadaan, keterangan yang ditimbangkan mestilah hanyalah menunjuk kepada satu butiran iaitu kesalahan tertuduh, ia tidak boleh berupaya kepada sebarang interpretasi lain atau sebarang makna lain ( kes ini bergantung kepada ujian kesimpulan tidak dapat disangkal -irrisistable conclusion test ).
19. Cabutan teks.
Facts:
In this case the appellant had been convicted of murder of a girl aged 11 years. The evidence against the appellant was entirely circumstantial. In his summing up the learned trial judge had explained all the facts of the case and laid emphasis on the evidence of appellant. He also said that for a court to rely on circumstantial evidence the evidence when considered must point only to the guilt of the accused; it must not be capable of any other interpretation or any other meaning.
Holdings:
Held in this case, in the light of the evidence, and taking the summing up as a whole it was impossible for the court to say that there had been a miscarriage of justice and therefore the appeal must be dismissed.[Editorial Note: See “McGreevy v DPP Revisited” [1974] 2 MLJ xxxiii.]
20. Tahap ini juga diguna dalam kes Dato Mokhtar Hashim & Anor V PP [1983] 2 MLJ 232.
Penerimaan kes Mc Greevy pada tahap rendah.
Pada tahun 1982 Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menggunakan prinsip dalam kes Mc Greevy. Ini berlaku dalam kes Jayaraman & Ors V PP [1982] 2 MLJ 273 apabila hakim Syed Othman berkata
“ Saya cukup sedar fomula “irresistible” yang digunakan oleh mahkamah di Malaysia dalam mengendalikan kes keterangan berdasarkan keadaan …. Dalam kes sekarang ianya hanyalah pemainan perkataan iaitu kedua-dua ujian adalah sama (Mc Greevy dan Reg. v Hodge ). Jika fakta terbukti alternatif kepada kesalahan tertuduh, atau dengan perkataan lain terdapat keraguan kepada kes pendakwa dan pendakwa dikatakan tidak membuktikan kesnya di luar keraguan munsabah. Dalam kes ini fakta yang dibukti tidak menunjuk kepada kesalahan tertuduh dan mahkamah yang melakukan pembicaraan tidak pasti akan kesalahan tertuduh dan mestilah membuang kes pendakwa oleh kerana tidak dapat membuktikan kesnya di luar sebarang keraguan munasabah. Dalam kes keterangan berdasarkan keadaan adalah mengcukupi jika mahkamah hanya menyatakan ia berpuas hati dengan kesalahan tertuduh (guilt of accused) di luar keraguan munasabah tanpa berkata lanjut fakta terbukti tidak dapat disangkal (irresistible) kepada satu butiran dan hanya satu kesimpulan iaitu tertuduh bersalah.
21. Mahkamah persekutuan membuat kesimpulan perkataan yang dinamakan “irresistible” hanyalah satu cara lain untuk menyatakan terbukti di luar sebarang keraguan munasabah (proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
Nota : terdapat keputusan kemudianya mahkamah telah merujuk kepada “ irrisistable conclusion test” (ujian kesimpulan yang tidak dapat disangkal ).
22. Cabutan teks
Facts:
This was an appeal against the decision of the learned President, Sessions Court, Kelang, convicting the appellants for causing the death of the four deceased persons under s 304 read in conjunction with s 34 of the Penal Code. The appeal raised a number of question of facts and law.
Holdings:
Held: (1) the appeal against the grounds of judgment in this case dealt too much on findings of fact rather than on substantial points of law. The appellate court has not hot had the advantage of seeing or hearing the witness and unless it could be shown that the trial court had misused its advantage, it was not for the appellate court to reverse the trial court’s findings. In this case not one of the numerous points alleging misdirection of facts taken alone or all those taken together could justify the appellate court of interfere with the findings of the trial court;
(2) as the earlier discharge of the accused did not amount to an acquittal the plea of autrefois acquit could not stand.
(3) in the circumstances of this case the prosecution was under no obligation to supply statements of their witness to the defence. The defence is only entitled to the police statement when a prosecution witness is to be impeached;
(4) whether or not there is an arrest is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court and in this case the learned President was right in holding that the Police Corporal was not making an arrest when he told the appellants not to leave the temple compound;
(5) the statement made by the appellant to the Police Corporal when he arrived at the scene were not admissible in evidence but the statements made to the Police Inspector were admissible as they were made to him before arrest;
(6) there was no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court that Inspector Govindan who recorded cautioned statements from the appellants, was competent in Tamil, that the words he used in the caution statements have the same effect as required by the Criminal Procedure Code and that the statements were recorded within the time stated in them. The cautioned statements were therefore rightly held to be admissible in evidence.
(7) in dealing with a case which relies on circumstantial evidence it is sufficient if the court makes a finding that in considering all the evidence it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the offence. In any case the learned President in his judgment came to the “inescapable conclusion” that the appellant were expert fighters, which is the same as “irresistible conclusion”;
(8) on the evidence the trial court formed the inescapable conclusion that the appellant were expert fighters. Considering the number of persons dead, four, and one badly injured on the grounds of the temple and the weapons used by the appellants, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that all the appellants must have participated in the fight;
(9) in this case the deceased persons died of very severe injuries and from the evidence the learned President was entitled to form his opinion as to the nature of the weapons which had been used to inflict the injuries. It did not take an expert to determine whether the injuries could or could not cause the death or what weapon was used to cause the injuries. These are question of fact and the trial court was in as good a position as the expert to determine the questions;
(10) from the injuries suffered only by two of the appellants the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the deceased persons offered hardly any resistance when they were attacked. With the instruments they had and having been surrounded by the appellants they were in no position to attack. The appellants had superior weapons and showed no mercy towards the deceased persons. All the evidence pointed to the conclusion that the appellants were all acting in concert and had the intention to kill from the outset. On the evidence the defence of self defence could not have considered;
(11) the finding of guilt against all the appellants must therefore be upheld. Although the sentences imposed were on the lenient side, they would not, in the special circumstances of the case, be disturbed.
Editorial Note : On Appeal, the above decision was affirmed by Federal Court on 10 June 1982.
23. Mahkamah Agong dalam kes Ng thian Soong V PP [1990] 2 MLJ 148 - mahkamah telah menggunakan formula kes Mc Greevy.
24. Beban bukti kes pendakwa samada dalam kes keterangan terus (direct evidence) atau keterangan berdasarkan keadaan adalah sama iaitu di luar sebarang keraguan munasabah.
25. Cabutan teks.
Facts:
The appellant had been tried by jury and found guilty of murder by a majority verdict of five to two and he was convicted and sentenced to death. On his appeal, three major arguments were raised and considered: (a) at the trial, after the jury had retired to consider their verdict at 5.57 pm, the foreman informed the judge at 8.08pm that the jury had come to a four to three decision whereupon the learned judge asked the jury to retire again for further consideration. It was only after the jury had retired for the second time that they returned a verdict of guilty of murder of a majority of five to two to which the learned judge concurred. It was argued that since the jury had already decided by a majority of four to three in the first instance, they became functus officio and as such the verdict by which the accused was found guilty was a nullity. It was also alleged in the petition of appeal that the learned judge had pressured the jury to come to a verdict by telling them they would have to stay the whole night until a verdict was reached; (b) the direction given to the jury on the subject of circumstantial evidence to connect the accused with the crime of murder was inadequate or insufficient; (c) the learned judge was wrong in ruling that the evidence of bare denial by the accused should be on the ground that it constituted a defence of alibi and therefore was not admissible in the absence of notice served on the prosecution under s 402A of the Criminal Procedure Code (FMS Cap 6) (‘CPC’).
Holdings:
Held, allowing the appeal of the accused:
(1) Since s 204(ii) of the CPC expressly requires that a majority verdict of the jury must not be less than five to two anything less cannot constitute a verdict in law. Accordingly, when the jury had indicated that they had reached a decision by a majority of four to three, the learned judge was perfectly entitled to resolve the deadlock by requiring them to retire for further consideration under s 228 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The functus officio argument is therefore wholly without substance.
(2) The procedure adopted by the learned judge in this case was in fact the practice recommended in Lee Koh Eng v PP [1975] 1 MLJ 132 (refd) and adopted ever since in the High Courts to avoid the very functus officio argument which was canvassed in this case.
(3) There is no merit in the complaint that the learned judge had directed the jury to reconsider their verdict at 8.08pm and indicated that they would have to stay the whole night until a verdict was reached. After the summing up in this case, it would be most undesirable to allow the jury to go home and to reconvene the next day for the verdict.
(4) In a case of the present nature where the strands of circumstantial evidence connecting the accused with the crime are capable of more than on inference, it is not sufficient for the trial judge merely to tabulate the indirect evidence. He must go one step further by directing the jury as to what other reasonable inferences could be drawn from each strand of circumstantial evidence and leaving it to the jury to decide which inference they wish to adopt. It is only when the combined strength of these inferences accepted by the jury when twisted together is strong enough to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt that a finding could be arrived at the guilt of the accused.
(5) The summing up of the learned trial judge on circumstantial evidence was manifestly inadequate so as to constitute a misdirection which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice in the circumstances of the particular case.
(6) The evidence excluded by the learned judge merely amounted to a bare denial and such evidence ought not to have been expunged. To deny the accused from putting his defence to the jury, however implausible it may appear, would most certainly occasion a miscarriage of justice particularly having regard to the weak nature of the prosecution’s case.
26. Walaupun terdapat keputusan dalam kes Ng Thian Soon perkara “ irresistible conclusion test” masih menghantui mahkamah agong melalui kes PP v Lim Lian Chen [1992] 4 CLJ 2086 pada pertuduhan mengedar dadah.
27. Apabila keterangan bergantung kepada keterangan berdasarkan keadaan beban bukti adalah sangat berat dan keterangan tidak dapat disangkal (irresistible ) mestilah menunjukkan kesalahan tertuduh. Jika terdapat satu gap (jurang) didalamnya maka ianya tidak mengcukupi untuk membukti kes terhadap tertuduh. Keterangan berdasarkan keadaan di mana perayu dicam oleh saksi sebelum itu adalah tidak cukup kuat kepada “ujian kesimpulan tidak dapat disangkal” bahawa tertuduh yang melakukan kesalahan.
28. Oleh kerana kes tersebut tidak mencapai tahap yang dikehendaki, sabitan diketepikan.
Penghuni Gua : Dengan membaca serba sedikit undang-undang kita boleh memahami lebih sedikit dari orang lain dan kurang sedikit pandai dari peguam profesional. Jika tak membaca langsung maka kita akan jadi loyar burok yanghanya berderai kokoknya dan tahinya dan bila menang nyaring hilai tawa memecah langit.
2. Biar kita pakar satu bidang tetapi lain-lain perkara itu kita ambil tahu sedikit-sedikit. Undang perlu dibaca selepas di pelajari juga dibaca sebelum dipelajari. Baru tahu apa yang tersurat dan tersirat. Begitu juga , Al Quran, Allah menyuruh Nabi Mohamad membacanya berkali-kali.
3. Bacalah , dan teruskan bacaan.
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