SISTEM KEADILAN JENAYAH : KES-KES BIDANG KUASA MAHKAMAH-MAHKAMAH

Nota : Kuliah lama PG yang ada dalam simpanan. Ia adalah juga catatan tambahan yang dibuat oleh seorang yang amat dedikasi di dalam kelas kami . Setinggi terima kaseh kepada Che Zaimani yang begitu rajin dalam membantu kami dahulu. Kepada semua pelayar blog ini, semuga dengan paparan ini, ianya akan memberi menafaat kepada semua dalam memahami secara ringkas mengenai Sistem keadilan Jenayah Di Malaysia. Tq

Sistem Keadilan Jenayah
Kes-kes bidang kuasa mahkamah Magistrate

1) CHEONG AH CHEOW v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [1985] 2 MLJ 257

[ Perayu telah didapati bersalah kerana menjalankan pertaruhan haram dibawah seksen 6(3)(a) Ordinan Pertaruhan dan dihukum RM20,000 dan jika gagal 12 bulan penjara.Rayuan dibuat kerana Magistrate tidak mempunyai kuasa menjatuh hukuman RM 20,000 dimana bidangkuasa Magistrate hanya RM10,000 dibawah Akta Mahkamah Rendah,1948. Diputuskan hukuman diberikan sah kerana dibawah undang-undang pertaruhan seksen 18(3) memberi kuasa kepada magistrate hukuman lebih dan bersesuaian dengan seksen 87(2) Akta Mahkamah Rendah.]

Facts:

The appellant had admitted to acting as a bookmaker in relation to the Merdeka Football Tournament and pleaded guilty to the offence under s 6(3)(a) of the Betting Ordinance, 1953. He was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment plus a fine of $20,000 in default 12 months imprisonment. The learned magistrate also ordered the forfeiture of the sum of $3,310 found on the appellant when he was arrested. The appeal was against sentence.

Holdings:

Held:

(1) the magistrate in this case has jurisdiction to award the full punishment authorised by s 6(3) of the Betting Ordinance because s 18(3) of the Betting Ordinance has given jurisdiction in excess of the power laid down by s 87(1) of the Subordinate Courts Act, 1948;

(2) the seriousness of the situation caused by bookmakers in relation to sports in this country needs no emphasis and is well known to everyone. Having regard to the prevalence of such offences in this country, the sentence which the learned magistrate has passed on the appellant is well justified both as a punishment for the appellant and as a warning to others who might be tempted to embark on similar enterprises;

(3) the period of imprisonment in default of paying the fine of $20,000 imposed should be reduced to six months, in accordance with s 283(1)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code;

(4) the money found on the accused was related to the bets placed and was rightly forfeited.

articles found on his stall (apart from the materials found near him which related to bookmaking), the money was related to the bets placed on the Merdeka Football Tournament. I confirm the forfeiture of the money.
Appeal dismissed.

2) PUBLIC PROSECUTOR v TENGKU HITAM [1962] 1 MLJ 414

[Perayu dituduh kerana melakukan CBT dibawah seksen 406 KK. Magistrate menjatuhkah hukuman 2 tahun penjara iaitu melebihi kuasa seorang Magistrate pada masa itu iaitu hanya 1 tahun penjara (nota: undang-undang baru 5 tahun penjara). Hukuman telah dipinda kepada 12 bulan penjara. Mah. Tinggi memberi nasihat sekiranya Magistrate merasakan hukuman diberi tidak mengcukupi kes seharus dipindah ke mahkamah yang lebih tinggi. Mahkamah tinggi meminda hukuman atas kuasa semakan dibawah seksen 325 CPC]

Facts:
Before a case is presented in court the prosecution must first satisfy itself whether the maximum punishment which such court can impose is adequate. If it thinks that such sentence is inadequate the case should be brought the court which has jurisdiction to try it. For example, a case which is ordinarily triable in a Magistrate’s court should be brought in the Sessions Court if the prosecution is of the opinion that upon conviction the maximum sentence which can be imposed by a Magistrate is inadequate. The provisions of s 87(2) of the Courts Ordinance, 1948, should only be invoked when the case takes an unexpected turn and the evidence so adduced shows that the maximum sentence that can be imposed by the trial Magistrate is inadequate. The sentence of two years’ mprisonment imposed by the learned Magistrate on a charge under s 406 of the Penal Code altered to that of 12 months.

3) ABDUL WAHAB v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [1970] 2 MLJ 203

[Tertuduh telah mengaku salah melakukan pecah rumah dibawah seksen 457 KK dan dihukum penjara 2 tahun , 6 kali sebatan dan juga 12 bulan pengawasan polis. Dia mempunyai 12 rekod kesalahan lepas. Hukuman telah dipinda kepada 10 tahun penjara. Dibawah seksen 87(2) Magistrate mempunyai kuasa menjatuhkan hukuman maksima sekiranya terdapat kesalahan lepas atau memindahkannya ke mahkamah lebih tinggi dibawah seksen 177 CPC. Seksen 457 KK hukumannya adalah 14 tahun penjara]

Facts:

The appellant had been convicted under s 457 of the Penal Code for having committed house-breaking in order to commit theft. He had twelve previous convictions. The learned magistrate sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment and six strokes of the rattan to the followed by twelve months of police supervision.
Holdings:

Held

(1) the learned magistrate should have acted under section 87(2) of the Courts Ordinance which gives power to a first class magistrate to award the full punishment authorized by law for the offence of which a person has been convicted;

(2) in this case the term of imprisonment should be increased to ten years.

4) PUBLIC PROSECUTOR V GOVINDNAN A/L CHINDEN NAIR 1998-2 MLJ 181

[ Tertuduh telah mengaku salah atas kesalahan curi dan dihukum penjara penjara 3 tahun atas pertimbangan dia telah mengaku salah. Tertuduh mempunyai 11 rekod kesalahan lepas. Rayuan dibuat kerana hukuman adalah ringan dan Magistrate terlalu menitik berat fakta tertuduh mengaku salah. Diputuskan perkara tersebut menyimpang dari rasional seksen 87(2) Akta Mahkamah Rendah iaitu hukuman maksima yang diperuntukkan dibawah undang-undang boleh dikenakan sekiranya terdapat rekod kesalahan lepas. Hukuman dipinda kepada 7 tahun penjara ]

Tertuduh dipertuduhkan dengan kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah s 379 Kanun Keseksaan (NMB Bab 45) ('Kanun tersebut'). Dia mengaku salah kepada pertuduhan. Tertuduh mempunyai sebanyak 11 sabitan dahulu. Untuk enam daripada kesalahan dahulunya, dia dijatuhkan hukuman penjara yang kurang daripada setahun; tiga tahun atau kurang daripada itu untuk tiga kesalahan dan lima tahun untuk dua lagi kesalahan termasuk yang terakhir. Dalam menghukum tertuduh, majistret mempertimbangkan fakta bahawa tertuduh telah mengaku salah dan berpandangan bahawa hukuman yang ringan mestilah dijatuhkan berikutan akuan salah dan menghukum tertuduh kepada pemenjaraan selama tiga tahun.

Pendakwa Raya merayu terhadap hukuman yang dijatuhkan. Ia dihujahkan bahawa majistret terlalu menitikberatkan akuan salah tertuduh dan tidak mempertimbangkan unsur kepentingan awam dalam menjatuhkan hukuman. Seterusnya, majistret telah gagal memberi pertimbangan yang mencukupi kepada sabitan dahulu tertuduh dan menghujahkan bahawa s 75 Kanun tersebut sepatutnya digunakan bagi memberi justifikasi kepada pemenjaraan untuk tempoh selama tujuh tahun.

Diputuskan, mengganti tempoh pemenjaraan tiga tahun dengan pemenjaraan tujuh tahun:

(1) Prinsip-prinsip yang menguasai suatu rayuan terhadap hukuman adalah mantap. Sekiranya sesuatu hukuman adalah melampau atau tidak memadai hinggakan memuaskan sebuah mahkamah rayuan bahawa apabila ia diluluskan terdapat kegagalan untuk memakai prinsip-prinsip yang betul, maka gangguan oleh mahkamah adalah berjustifikasi. Pada umumnya, dalam menghukum, kepentingan awam mestilah merupakan salah satu daripada pertimbangan utama. Suatu unsur kepentingan umum yang utama adalah bahawa keadilan bermakna keadilan bukan sahaja kepada tertuduh tetapi juga keadilan kepada masyarakat.

Oleh itu, dalam menjatuhkan hukuman, sesebuah mahkamah haruslah mempertimbangkan bukan sahaja kesalahan dan pesalah, tetapi juga kepentingan masyarakat. Di mana seseorang didapati adalah pesalah berulang-ulang, maka adalah dalam kepentingan awam bahawa hukuman pencegahan dijatuhkan. Ini tidak bermakna bahawa seseorang dengan sabitan dahulu tidak berhak mendapat layanan ringan. Tetapi di mana sabitan dahulu seseorang bertambah secara progresif, faktor-faktor peringanan yang memihak kepadanya berkurangan secara sepadan dan mungkin akan habis.Adalah diterima secara umum bahawa seseorang tertuduh patut diberikan kredit atau diskaun kerana mengaku salah.

Namun demikian, suatu akuan salah patut dipertimbangkan memihak kepada tertuduh hanya apabila segala faktor dan keadaan lain yang mengelilingi kelakuan kesalahan memberi justifikasi kepada pertimbangan sedemikian. Pemakaiannya memihak kepada tertuduh bergantung pada keadaan setiap kes. Justeru itu, tiada rukun automatik bahawa satu akuan salah dengan sendirinya memberi hak mendapat hukuman yang lebih ringan kepada tertuduh.Dalam mengenakan hukuman, majistret terlalu mementingkan akuan salah tertuduh. Pendapat beliau bahawa hukuman yang ringan mestilah dikenakan berikutan akuan salah jelas adalah salah di sisi undang-undang. Ia mengabaikan hakikat bahawa akuan mestilah dipertimbangkan memandangkan keadaan kes yang lain.

Pendapat lanjut beliau bahawa tempoh pemenjaraan yang lama tidak akan mengubah perangai tertuduh sebagaimana yang ditunjukkan oleh tempoh lima tahun terdahulu tidak boleh dikekalkan. Ini tidak berharmoni dengan prinsip-prinsip asas menghukum dan menyimpang daripada rasional s 87(2) Akta Mahkamah Rendah 1948 ('Akta tersebut') yang memberi kuasa kepada majistret untuk mengenakan hukuman penuh yang ditetapkan untuk kesalahan ke atas seorang yang disabit sekiranya beliau puas hati bahawa sabitan dahulu atau latar belakang orang itu mewajarkan hukuman demikian. Beliau telah terlepas perhatian unsur kepentingan awam hendaklah dipenuhi berkaitan dengan pesalah berulang-ulang seperti tertuduh. Deret sabitan dahulu tertuduh telah mencapai takat di mana faktor-faktor peringanan yang memihak kepadanya telah pun habis.

Dalam keadaan ini, ini merupakan kes wajar di mana majistret sepatutnya telah bertindak di bawah s 87(2) Akta tersebut. Oleh kerana majistret telah meneruskan atas prinsip kehakiman yang salah, hukuman yang dijatuhkan oleh beliau mewajarkan gangguan oleh mahkamah ini (lihat ms 190G, 191F-I dan 192B-C, G-I).

(2) Di mana adalah wajar untuk menggunakan s 75 Kanun tersebut, satu pertuduhan berasingan di bawah seksyen tersebut mestilah dibuat dan direkodkan sekiranya tertuduh akan dibicarakan untuk kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawahnya. Ini adalah menurut keperluan s 152(6) Kanun Acara Jenayah (NMB Bab 6). Maka, satu pertuduhan melakukan kesalahan selepas sabitan dahulu harus mengandungi pengataan bahawa kesalahan telah dilakukan selepas sabitan dahulu. Apa yang mesti dinyatakan dalam pertuduhan adalah fakta-fakta, tarikh dan tempat sabitan dahulu.

Sekiranya pernyataan demikian telah tertinggal, mahkamah boleh menambahnya bila-bila masa sebelum hukuman dijatuhkan, tetapi ia tidak boleh dilakukan selepas hukuman dijatuhkan.Dalam kes ini, tiada pertuduhan yang berasingan di bawah seksyen tersebut telah dibuat terhadap tertuduh sebelum dia dihukum. Tiada permohonan pun telah dibuat kepada mahkamah untuk menambahnya kepada pertuduhan sebelum hukuman dijatuhkan. Mahkamah juga tidak boleh mempertimbangkannya sewaktu menjatuhkan hukuman andainya ia tidak disebut dalam pertuduhan. Oleh itu, pihak pendakwa kini tidak boleh meminta supaya seksyen tersebut digunakan.

Oleh kerana hukuman yang diinginkan oleh pihak pendakwa adalah maksima yang dibenarkan di bawah undang-undang untuk kesalahan yang mana tertuduh telah dipertuduhkan dan melebihi tempoh pemenjaraan lima tahun yang boleh dikenakan oleh majistret seperti yang diperuntukkan oleh s 87(1) Akta tersebut, peruntukan yang lebih wajar untuk dipertimbangkan ialah s 87(2) Akta tersebut (lihat ms 188D-I dan 189A-B, E-G).]

5) LEE BOON TUAN v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [1960] 1 MLJ 179

[ Tertuduh telah disabitkan atas kesalahan memandu kenderaan secara merbahaya dan menyebab kematian dibawah seksen 304A KK. Sebahagian dari keterangan di rekod oleh magistrate di tempat kejadian. Peguam mempertikaikan tempat kejadian tidak boleh diambil keterangan kecuali di mahkamah terbuka seperti seksen 7 CPC. Diputuskan tidak ada peruntukan magistrate tidak boleh mengambil keterangan ditempat kejadian dan selagi dia bertindak dibawah bidang kuasa kawasannya dibawah seksen 419 CPC maka tindakan itu adalah sah]

Facts:

In this case the appellant had been convicted and sentenced on a charge under s 304A of the Penal Code of causing death by a rash act while being the driver of a motor vehicle. Part of the evidence was recorded by the learned Magistrate at the scene of the accident. The appellant contended that the evidence at the scene of the accident was wholly inadmissible against him, and in support of this contention it was argued, inter alia, that the learned Magistrate was merely entitled to view the scene in the presence of the parties and should have recorded oral evidence in open Court, because the scene itself was not a public place.

Holdings:

Held

(1) a Magistrate sitting alone exercises the function of both Judge and Jury;

(2) as the scene of the accident in this case was within the local area over which the Magistrate had jurisdiction it could not be argued that a part of the trial was held in a wrong local area within the meaning of s 419 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 6);

(3) there is nothing in the Criminal Procedure Code which limits the right of the Court to conduct any inquiry or try any offence outside the Court building so long as the public are not specifically excluded.

Bidang kuasa mahkamah Seysen

1) NG KOOK KIN V PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [1995] 2 MLJ 35

[ Tuduhan dibawah akta lembaga kemajuan ikan dan disabitkan kesalahan oleh magistrate dan dijatuh hukum serta ikan di rampas. Rayuan dibuat kerana Magistrate tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa disebabkan seksen 20 Akta tersebut menyatakan hanya mahkamah seksen yang berkuasa membicarakannya. Diputuskan hukuman dan sabitan diketepikan disebabkan perkataan hendaklah/adalah (shall) dalam seksen 20 adalah berunsur mandatori dan perlu di patuhi ]

Bahasa Malaysia Summary:

Pemohon dalam kes ini telah didakwa di mahkamah majistret di bawah peraturan 4A(3) Peraturan-Peraturan Pemasaran Ikan 1973, yang boleh dihukum di bawah Akta Lembaga Kemajuan Ikan Malaysia 1971 (‘Akta tersebut’). Pemohon telah mengaku salah. Lalu, majistret tersebut telah menyabit dan menjatuhkan hukuman terhadap pemohon, dan seterusnya memerintahkan supaya hasil jualan ikan serta van pemohon dilucuthakkan.

Walau bagaimanapun, pemohon kemudiannya mengusulkan suatu penyemakan dalam Mahkamah Tinggi mengenai keesahan perintah yang telah diluluskan oleh majistret, dan juga sama ada prosiding mahkamah adalah mengikut aturan atau tidak. Pemohon menegaskan bahawa mahkamah yang mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar dan menyelesaikan kes ini ialah mahkamah sesyen, dan bukannya mahkamah majistret.

Beliau bergantung pada s 20 Akta tersebut yang secara keseluruhannya menyatakan bahawa sesuatu mahkamah sesyen di Malaysia Barat ‘adalah’ mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk membicarakan sebarang kesalahan dan menjatuhkan hukuman penuh bagi sebarang kesalahan di bawah Akta tersebut. Sebaliknya, pihak pendakwa berhujah bahawa mahkamah majistret mempunyai bidang kuasa, berdasarkan alasan bahawa s 20 Akta tersebut adalah diungkap secara permisif dan bukan mewajibkan.

Diputuskan:

Diputuskan, membatalkan sabitan dan hukuman, mengetepikan perintah pelucuthakan, dan memerintahkan supaya kes dipindahkan ke mahkamah sesyen:

(1) Oleh kerana perkataan-perkataan dalam s 20 Akta tersebut adalah tepat dan tidak taksa, mahkamah hanya perlu mentafsirkan perkataan-perkataan tersebut mengikut ertikata mereka yang biasa dan lazim. Perkataan-perkataan tersebut dengan sendirinya menyatakan niat Parlimen, dan mahkamah tidak boleh memasukkan perkataan ke dalamnya atau membubuhkan tanda baca sendiri supaya memberikannya suatu makna yang berlainan.

(2) Dalam kes ini, dengan membaca s 20 Akta tersebut secara literal, hanya mahkamah sesyen yang diletakhakkan dengan bidang kuasa untuk mendengar dan menyelesaikan kes pemohon. Ini disebabkan perkataan ‘adalah’ yang terdapat di dalam s 20 mencerminkan unsur mandatori dan seksyen itu memberikuasa kepada hanya mahkamah sesyen untuk menjatuhkan hukuman penuh bagi kesalahan di bawahnya.

2) LEE NGAK PIEW V PUBLIC PROSECUTOR 1999-4 MLJ 79

[ Tuduhan adalah hidup diatas hasil pelacuran dibawah seksen 19 Akta Perlindungan Gadis dan Wanita dan seksen 31 menyatakan hanya mahkamah Session sahaja berkuasa membicara kes dibawah akta tersebut. Dalam kes ini Magistrate yang membicara dan mengsabitkan hukuman. Diputuskan hukuman diketepikan oleh kerana peruntukan tersebut jelas]

Perayu, yang tidak diwakili oleh seorang peguam, telah disabitkan dengan kesalahan di bawah s 19(1) Akta Perlindungan Wanita dan Perempuan 1973 ('Akta tersebut') di Mahkamah Majistret Georgetown, Pulau Pinang. Beliau telah kemudiannya mengekalkan seorang peguam dan membuat rayuan ke Mahkamah Tinggi terhadap kedua-dua sabitan dan hukuman. Isu utama yang timbul di dalam rayuan itu adalah sama ada mahkamah majistret mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar kesalahan-kesalahan di bawah Akta tersebut.

Pada tahap ini, peguam bagi pihak perayu menegaskan bahawa menurut s 31(1) Akta tersebut, hanya mahkamah majistret mempunyai bidang kuasa eksklusif untuk mendengar kesalahan- kesalahan di bawah Akta tersebut. Oleh itu, peguam menghujahkan, Mahkamah Majistret di Georgetown tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar kes terhadap tertuduh ini. Timbalan Pendakwa Raya bagaimanapun menghujahkan bahawa seorang majistret diberi kuasa untuk mendengar kes-kes di bawah Akta tersebut berdasarkan bidang kuasa umum yang diberikan ke atas seorang majistret melalui s 87(1) Akta Mahkamah Rendah 1948, sebagaimana yang dipinda oleh Akta A434 yang mula berkuatkuasa pada 1 Julai 1978.

Mahkamah Tinggi, oleh demikian, perlu mentafsirkan s 31 Akta tersebut, peruntukan-peruntukan Akta Mahkamah Rendah 1948 sebagaimana yang dipinda oleh Akta A434 dan peruntukan- peruntukan Akta A434.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tetapi meremitkan kes ini ke mahkamah sesyen untuk perbicaraan:

(1) Kaedah asas pentafsiran adalah untuk membaca statut secara literal, ie dengan memberi perkataan-perkataan yang digunakan oleh badan perundangan maksud biasa, semulajadi dan tatabahasa perkataan-perkataan ini. Di mana bahasa undang- undang adalah jelas, keberkesanan perlu diberikan kepadanya.

Kaedah pentafsiran yang kedua memerlukan pemakaian prinsip 'expressio unlus est exclusio alteriua' yang bermaksud 'penafsiran sesuatu mengecualikan sesuatu yang tidak ditafsirkan secara nyata'. Berdasarkan fakta-fakta berikut, dengan pemakaian kaedah pentafsiran yang pertama kepada perkataan-perkataan di dalam s 31(1) Akta tersebut, dan memberikan perkataan- perkataan tersebut maksud biasa, semulajadi dan tatabahasanya, adalah jelas bahawa di Semenanjung Malaysia sahaja mahkamah sesyen diberikan bidang kuasa untuk mendengar kesalahan- kesalahan di bawah Akta tersebut manakala di Sabah dan Sarawak kesalahan-kesalahan seperti ini termasuk di bawah bidang kuasa mahkamah kelas pertama.

Dengan pemakaian kaedah pentafsiran yang kedua kepada s 31 akan membawa kepada akibat yang sama memandangkan kewujudan perkataan 'Mahkamah Kelas Pertama di Sabah dan Sarawak' dan ketiadaan perkataan 'Mahkamah Kelas Pertama di Semenanjung Malaysia' perlu ditafsirkan sebagai bermaksud bahawa seorang Majistret Kelas Pertama di Semenanjung Malaysia tidak ada bidang kuasa untuk mendengar kesalahan-kesalahan di bawah Akta tersebut (lihat ms 84H-85C).

(2) Akta A434 tidak memperluaskan bidang kuasa mahkamah- mahkamah dengan meminda s 87(1) Akta Mahkamah Rendah 1948 tetapi ia juga telah membuat pindaan-pindaan penting untuk menspesifikasikan undang-undang bertulis, seperti Akta Kastam 1967. Pindaan-pindaan kepada Akta Kastam 1967 telah menyebabkan pemotongan perkataan-perkataan 'mahkamah sesyen di negeri-negeri Malaya atau' dan perkataan-perkataan 'di Sabah dan Sarawak' di dalam s 118 Akta yang disebutkan yang demikian telah memindahkan bidang kuasa mahkamah sesyen Semenanjung Malaysia untuk mendengar kesalahan-kesalahan di bawah Akta Kastam dan meletakkan kesalahan-kesalahan tersebut di bawah bidang kuasa mahkamah majistret kelas pertama, di mana sahaja diletakkan sebaliknya.

Oleh itu, jika badan penggubalan telah bermaksud untuk majistret kelas pertama di Semenanjung Malaysia menangani kesalahan- kesalahan di bawah Akta Perlindungan Wanita dan Perempuan 1973, ia akan membuat pindaan-pindaan penting yang sama pada Akta Perlindungan Wanita dan Perempuan 1973. Sewajarnya, sabitan dan hukuman yang direkodkan terhadap perayu oleh majistret adalah batal dan tidak sah dan patut diketepikan. Di dalam keadaan di sini dan dengan mengambil kira kepentingan awam, adalah betul bagi kes ini dihantar balik ke mahkamah sesyen untuk perbicaraan (lihat ms 85E-F, 86A-D, F, H, 87A).]

3) PUBLIC PROSECUTOR V CHANG HAN YUAN 1999-4 MLJ 49

[ Tuduhan adalah seorang orang tengah dalam aktiviti pelacuran dibawah seksen 16(1)(k) Akta Perlindungan Gadis dan Wanita dan hukum oleh magistrate dengan RM 3,000/- atau gagal 3 bulan penjara. Rayuan dibuat kerana hanya mahkamah session sahaja mempunyai bidangkuasa membicara dibawah seksen 31 akta tersebut. Diputuskan seksen 31 menyatakan `suatu mahkamah session ` tidak memberi makna eklusif bahawa mahkamah session sahaja dan mah magistrate dibenar juga mendengar kes (nota keputusan ini bercanggah dari keputusan kes Lee Ngah Piew) ]

Penentang telah mengaku salah untuk kesalahan di bawah s 16(1)(k) Akta Perlindungan Wanita dan Gadis 1973 ('Akta tersebut') di Mahkamah Majistret di Kuala Lumpur. Beliau disabit dan dihukumkan oleh majistret yang bijaksana dengan denda sebanyak RM3,000 sekira ingkar tiga bulan penjara. Pendakwa Raya telah membuat rayuan terhadap hukuman itu. Di perbicaraan rayuan itu, hakim Mahkamah Tinggi yang arif, melaksanakan kuasa-kuasa penyemakan, mempelawa pihak-pihak tersebut untuk menghujahkan penafsiran s 31(1) Akta tersebut.

Hakim yang arif itu telah dengan segera melaksanakan kuasa-kuasa sedemikian disebabkan oleh perhatian beliau yang tertarik kepada satu laporan akhbar harian. Ia telah dilaporkan bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi Pulau Pinang telah di dalam satu kes yang diputuskan baru-baru ini bahawa s 31(1) Akta tersebut memberikan bidang kuasa eksklusif kepada mahkamah sesyen untuk mendengar dan menyelesaikan kes-kes di bawah Akta tersebut (lihat kes Lee Nyak Piew v Public Prosecutor (1999) 4 MLJ 79).

Timbalan Pendakwa Raya telah menghujahkan bahawa s 31(1) Akta tersebut tidak bersifat eksklusif dan tidak menyingkir bidang kuasa mahkamah majistret. Peguam bagi pihak penentang walau bagaimanapun telah menghujahkan bahawa s 31(1) Akta tersebut sememangnya bersifat eksklusif dan hanya memberikan mahkamah sesyen bidang kuasa sedemikian. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi di Kuala Lumpur yang arif oleh itu telah mengambil kira skop dan kesan frasa '... suatu Mahkamah Sesyen di Semenanjung Malaysia ... hendaklah mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar suatu kesalahan ...' ('frasa tersebut').

Diputuskan, memutuskan bahawa s 31(1) Akta tersebut adalah permisif dan menambahkan denda kepada RM5,000 setelah mengambil kira merit rayuan tersebut:

(1) Rukun penafsiran yang asas adalah bahawa pengecualian bidang kuasa mahkamah-mahkamah tidak boleh dengan serta merta diinferenskan dan pengecualian demikian mestilah sama ada dinyatakan secara eksplisit atau tersirat dengan jelas. Rukun penafsiran tidak terhad kepada mahkamah-mahkamah sivil sahaja tetapi terpakai kepada semua mahkamah-mahkamah pemakaian umum termasuklah mahkamah-mahkamah jenayah. Rukun terhadap pengecualian bidang kuasa mahkamah-mahkamah hanya terpakai di mana terdapat dua atau lebih penafsiran yang mungkin munasabah yang terbuka kepada bahasa statut dan bukan di mana tujuan badan perundangan adalah jelas dan nyata untuk menyingkir bidang kuasa tersebut.

Berdasarkan fakta-fakta ini terdapat ketiadaan perkataan-perkataan yang jelas dan tidak taksa di dalam s 31(1) Akta tersebut dan oleh itu tiada niat badan perundangan untuk menyingkir bidang kuasa mahkamah majistret untuk mendengar kesalahan-kesalahan di bawah Akta tersebut. Penyataan penerangan di dalam Rang Undang-Undang Akta tersebut seterusnya menunjukkan bahawa bidang kuasa yang diberikan kepada mahkamah sesyen bertujuan permisif di mana mahkamah sesyen tidak sepatutnya mempunyai bidang kuasa eksklusif untuk mendengar kesalahan-kesalahan di bawah Akta tersebut dan menyebabkan mahkamah majistret serba kekurangan bidang kuasa tersebut (lihat ms 54H-55F).

(2) Perkataan 'hendaklah' di dalam frasa itu hanya bermaksud bahawa apabila suatu kesalahan di bawah Akta tersebut difailkan di mahkamah sesyen adalah sangat mustahak untuk mahkamah sesyen melaksanakan bidang kuasa tersebut. Penggunaan perkataan 'hendaklah' di dalam frasa itu oleh demikian merujuk kepada sifat imperatif yang berhubung dengan pelaksanaan bidang kuasa dan bukan kepada sifat eksklusif yang membataskan [*8] bidang kuasa tersebut kepada mahkamah sesyen. Walaupun perkataan 'boleh' telah digunakan di dalam frasa itu, penafsiran yang sama akan terpakai memandangkan adalah diakui bahawa di mana terdapat autoriti untuk melaksanakan bidang kuasa maka kuasa itu mesti dilaksanakan walaupun dinyatakan mengikut terma-terma budi bicara (lihat ms 55F-H).

(3) Apabila Akta tersebut digubal pada tahun 1973, salah satu daripada objektif-objektif Akta tersebut adalah untuk menambah penalti-penalti kepada kesalahan-kesalahan di bawahnya. Namun begitu bidang kuasa hukuman mahkamah majistret adalah terhad ketika itu dan mahkamah majistret tidak boleh ketika itu mengenakan hukuman penuh seperti mana yang diperuntukkan di bawah Akta tersebut di dalam kes-kes yang sesuai. Bidang kuasa mahkamah sesyen sebaliknya adalah lebih luas. Justeru itu Parlimen telah menggubal s 31(1) Akta tersebut untuk memberikan bidang kuasa tambahan kepada mahkamah sesyen dengan kuasa untuk mengenakan hukuman penuh di bawah Akta tersebut bagi mencapai objektif Akta tersebut. Pada ketika ini dengan pertambahan di dalam bidang kuasa mahkamah majistret, s 31(1) telah tidak digunakan lagi (lihat ms 56F-57B).]

Bidang kuasa Mahkamah Tinggi

1) PUBLIC PROSECUTOR V HENRY TAYE JOHNSON [1995] 1 MLJ 146

[ 3 tuduhan dibuat kepada seorang rakyat Nigeria kerana melakukan penipuan dengan jalan penyamaran. Kesalahan berlaku di perairan antarabangsa didalam kapal terbang yang di daftar di Brunai. Magistrate enggan membicara kes tersebut atas alasan tidak ada bidang kuasa. Diputuskan dibawah jadual pertama Akta Konvesyen Tokyo, 1967 menyatakan tempat berlakunya kes adalah tempat dimana kapal terbang itu di daftarkan.Dan sebelum perkara ini dilakukan ianya mestilah mendapat kebenaran pendakwaraya di tempat tersebut seperti seksen 2 Akta Penerbangan (Brunai). Oleh itu Magistarate mempunyai kuasa untuk membicarakan kes ini]

Facts:

Three charges were brought against the respondent, a national of Nigeria, for cheating by personation. The offences in question were alleged to have taken place in the air, over international waters, aboard an aircraft of Royal Brunei Airlines. The public prosecutor appealed against the ruling of the judge in the intermediate court that she lacked jurisdiction to entertain the three charges.

Holdings:

Held, allowing the appeal:

The First Schedule to the Tokyo Convention Act 1967 (Overseas Territories) Order 1968 (‘the Order’) provides that for the purpose of juridiction, any offence under the law in force in the ‘territory’ committed on board a British-controlled aircraft in flight is deemed to have been committed in the ‘territory’ and that the consent of a competent authority of the ‘territory’ is required before any proceedings may be instituted against an offender. By virtue of s 2 of the Air Navigation Act (Cap 113), Brunei is a ‘territory’ in the context and by para 7 of the Order, a British-controlled aircraft means an aircraft registered in the UK or in any ‘territory’. Therefore, subject to proof that the aircraft was registered in Brunei and that the Attorney General, as the competent authority, had signified his consent to the prosecution, the intermediate court had jurisdiction to entertain the three charges in question.

2) REPCO HOLDINGS BHD V PUBLIC PROSECUTOR 1997-3 MLJ 681

[ Tuduhan adalah dibawah suruhanjaya sekuriti. Peguam membantah kehadiran pegawai pendakwa dibawah seksen 126(2) yang membenarkan pendakwaan dijalankan oleh Pendaftar Syarikat. Perkara ini katakana bercanggah dengan artikel 145(3) Perlembagaan yang hanya menyatakan Peguam Negara. Diputuskan seksen tersebut terbatal kerana bercanggah dengan perlembagaan]

Pemohon, Repco Holdings Bhd ('Repco'), telah dipertuduhkan oleh Suruhanjaya Sekuriti ('suruhanjaya tersebut') -- sebuah badan yang ditubuhkan oleh Akta Suruhanjaya Sekuriti 1993 ('ASS') -- kerana melanggar s 86 Akta Perindustrian Sekuriti 1983 ('APS'). Di pembicaraan, peguam Repco membuat bantahan permulaan atas locus standi dua orang pegawai suruhanjaya tersebut yang hadir untuk mendakwa kes. Pihak pendakwa dikendalikan oleh dua orang pegawai tersebut menurut operasi bersama s 126(2) ASS dan s 39(2) APS yang, antara lain, membenarkan pendakwaan mana-mana kesalahan di bawah Akta-Akta tersebut untuk dijalankan oleh Pendaftar Syarikat atau oleh mana-mana pegawai yang diberikuasa oleh Pendaftar Syarikat atau Pengerusi suruhanjaya tersebut atau suruhanjaya tersebut.

Adalah dihujahkan bahawa s 126(2) ASS dan s 39(2) APS adalah ultra vires perkara 145(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan adalah terbatal setakat itu. Hakim sesyen, yang dihadapi dengan hujah perlembagaan, bertindak di bawah s 30 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 dan menghantar rekod kes ke Mahkamah Tinggi bagi menentukan perlembagaan dua subseksyen itu.

Diputuskan, mengisytiharkan kedua-dua s 129(2) APS dan s 39(2) ASS tidak menurut perlembagaan, tak sah dan terbatal:

(1) Satu-satunya autoriti yang berhak di sisi perlembagaan untuk mengendalikan pendakwaan adalah Peguam Negara sebagai Pendakwa Raya. Susunan prosedur yang termaktub dalam s 376 dan seksyen-seksyen yang berikutnya dalam Kanun Acara Jenayah (NMB Bab 6) ('KAJ') meletakkan perkara ini di luar batas keraguan (lihat ms 688B);

PP v Datuk Harun bin Hj Idris & Ors (1976) 2 MLJ 116 dan
PP v Lim Shui Wang & Ors (1979) 1 MLJ 65 diikut.

(2) Berdasarkan autoriti-autoriti, ungkapan 'menjalankan' yang menonjol dalam perkara 145(3) dan dalam dua subseksyen yang dipersoalkan membawa maksud yang sama. Oleh kerana Perlembagaan memberikuasa kepada Peguam Negara secara eksklusif untuk menjalankan pendakwaan, ini bermakna bahawa tiada pihak berkuasa yang lain boleh mempunyai kuasa di sisi undang-undang untuk melaksanakan fungsi itu. Maka, s 126(2) APS yang membenarkan pendakwaan dijalankan oleh Pendaftar Syarikat atau mana-mana pegawai lain yang diberikuasa oleh Pendaftar atau Pengerusi suruhanjaya tersebut adalah ultra vires perkara 145(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

Walau bagaimanapun, jika Pendaftar Syarikat adalah timbalan pendakwa raya yang diwartakan dan dalam keupayaan demikian menjalankan pendakwaan ke atas kesalahan di bawah APS, ini tidak terperangkap oleh perkara 145(3) Perlembagaan. Sebaliknya, Pengerusi suruhanjaya tersebut tidak berada dalam [*7] kedudukan yang sama dan dengan itu tidak diberikuasa menurut perlembagaan untuk memberikuasa atau untuk menjalankan pendakwaan di bawah APS. Selanjutnya, walaupun untuk tujuan menjalankan tugas, ahli-ahli dan pekerja-pekerja suruhanjaya tersebut dianggap sebagai pegawai awam, mereka tidak dirangkumi oleh skop s 380(i) KAJ bagi membenarkan mereka menjalankan pendakwaan (lihat ms 690C-G);
Long bin Samat & Ors v PP (1974) 2 MLJ 152 dan
Johnson Tan Han Seng v PP (1977) 2 MLJ 66 diikut.

(3) Dalam cara yang sama, s 39(2) ASS pada keseluruhannya menyalahi perkara 145(3). Disebabkan perkara 4(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan, ia merupakan undang-undang yang tidak konsisten dengan Perlembagaan, subseksyen itu memberi laluan dan dengan itu adalah tak sah dan melanggar perlembagaan (lihat ms 691B).

(4) Adalah sungguh tidak adil untuk membuat keputusan secara kebelakangan atas ketaksahan dua subseksyen yang dipersoalkan. Dengan itu, perisytiharan atas ketaksahan haruslah menjadi prospektif sahaja dan harus termasuk hanya kes ini dan kes-kes yang didaftarkan dari tarikh keputusan (lihat ms 692A-B);

3) LONG BIN SAMAT & ORS v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [1974] 2 MLJ 152

[ Tuduhan adalah dengan sengaja menyebabkan cedera dibawah seksen 324 KK. Semasa pembicaraan didapati kecederaan adalah cedera parah dibawah seksen 326 KK dan Magistrate masih meneruskan pembicaraan dimana dia tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa. Oleh itu rayuan dibuat dengan alasan pembicaraan adalah tidak sah kerana magistrate tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa mendengar kes itu. Diputuskan kuasa sepenohnya untuk meneruskan pembicaraan atau tidak adalah pada peguam negara (artikel 145(3) Perlembagaan) dan sekiranya kesalahan lebih berat ia sepatuhnya dipindah kepada mah lebih tinggi dan pembicaraan itu oleh demikian bukannya tidak sah]

Facts:
In this case the accused had been tried and convicted before a Magistrate’s Court of the offence of voluntarily causing hurt by means of an instrument for cutting, namely a parang, an offence punishable under s 324 of the Penal Code. In the course of trial, it transpired that the hurt suffered by the victim was grievous hurt. The learned magistrate ignored this evidence and went on with the trial at the end of which he convicted and sentenced the accused as charged under s 324 of the Penal Code. On appeal to the High Court it was contended that as the victim’s hurt was grievous the accused should have been charged and tried under s 326 of the Penal Code, which prescribes a penalty of penal servitude for life or ten years’ imprisonment and that as such a charge would have been beyond the jurisdiction of the magistrate, the trial in this case was a nullity. In the High Court, Ibrahim J held that the trial was not a nullity but he referred the following question to the Federal Court —

“whether in view of the fact that the accused were charged under s 324 of the Penal Code and tried by the magistrate in the lower court and decided therein the facts clearly disclosed an offence under s 326 of the Penal Code the said trial was a nullity?”
Holdings:

Held: (1) the Public Prosecutor is given wide discretion over the control and direction of all criminal proceedings and can in particular decide to prefer a charge for a less serious offence when there is evidence of a more serious offence which should be tried in a higher court.
(2) the trial in this case was not a nullity and therefore the question referred to the Federal Court must be answered in the negative.

Kes-kes keselamatan dan ESCAR

1) DATO MOKHTAR BIN HASHIM & ANOR v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [1983] 2 MLJ 232

[ Pembunuhan berlaku di Negeri Sembilan tetapi pembicaraan dijalankan di Kuala Lumpur atas alasan kes keselamatan dibawah seksen 2 ESCAR. Pembicaraan dikatakan tidak sah dan diluar bidang kuasa. Diputuskan oleh kerana sijil dikeluarkan maka pembicaraan tersebut adalah sah]

Facts:

This was an appeal against the conviction of the appellants on a charge of murder. It was alleged at the trial that the two appellants together with two other persons, in furtherance of their common intention did commit murder by causing the death of one Dato Mohamad Taha bin Talib and thereby committed an offence punishable under s 302 read with s 34 of the Penal Code. The case was classified as a security case by virtue of a certificate issued by the Attorney General under the provisions of reg 2(2) of the Essential (Security Cases) Regulations, 1975. The case was heard in the High Court in Kuala Lumpur. At the end of the case of the prosecution the learned trial judge acquitted the other two accused on the ground that no prima facie case had been shown against them, but called on the appellants for their defence. At the conclusion of the case for the defence the learned trial judge convicted the appellants. The appellants appealed against their conviction and sentence.

Holdings:

Held:
(1) the point that this was not a security case but one of law and order and that in the circumstances the Attorney General could not and should not have issued his certificate under the Essential (Security Cases) Regulations 1975, had been decided by the Federal Court in Mohd Noordin bin Johan v Attorney General Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 66, 72 which arose out of and in connection with the same proceedings by an application by one of the first appellants’ co-accused. Moreover, the first appellant had applied by certiorari to question the Attorney General’s certificate in this matter but leave was refused. The attempt to re-litigate and re-open an issue conclusively decided in respect of the same proceedings and between the same parties would appear to be a clear instance of an abuse of the process of the court;

(2) under reg 21 of the Essential (Security Cases) Regulations the prosecution must prove that a statement made by the accused was voluntary if they had wanted to rely on it;

(3) the lock-up register was clearly admissible under s 35 of the Evidence Act as it was a journal within r 34(2) of the Lock-up Rules 1953 and the lock-up register produced in this case had cross-references to entries in the station diaries; this correlation would therefore make all the relevant entries in the station diaries admissible as they formed part of the lock-up register and the two must therefore be read co-jointly. The entries were confirmed by the evidence of a prosecution witness and accordingly formed part of the evidence before the learned judge in the voir dire;

(4) it was open to an Appellate Court to interfere with the finding on a question of fact as to the voluntariness of a confession if the impugned finding had been reached without applying the true and relevant legal tests and consideration of relevant matters. In this case the learned trial judge wholly discounted the entries in the station diaries and appeared to have adopted an approach that was incorrect in that he seemed to virtually reverse the burden of proof on the second appellant to rebut the evidence for the prosecution instead of dealing with the matter as one for the prosecution to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the statement made by the second appellant was voluntary. The entries in the station diaries which were confirmed by the evidence of a prosecution witness showed prolonged periods of the interrogation ranging into the early hours of the morning in breach of r 20 of the Lock-up Rules. In the circumstances it would be wholly unsafe to treat the statement as voluntary and it should not have been admitted in evidence;

(5) the entire case against the second appellant rested on this statement and nothing else and apart from that there was no other evidence against him. His defence should not therefore have been called as there was no case against him. His appeal should therefore be allowed and his conviction set aside;

(6) where circumstantial evidence is the basis of the prosecution case the evidence must irresistibly point to one and only one conclusion, the guilt of the accused, but in a case tried without a jury, the failure by the court to expressly state this is not fatal and it would suffice if it merely says that it is satisfied as to the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt;

(7) the credibility of a witness is primarily a matter for the trial judge. The functions of an Appellate Court, when dealing with a question of fact in which questions of credibility are involved are limited in their character and scope and in an appeal from a decision of a trial judge based on his opinion of the trustworthiness of witnesses whom he has seen, an Appellate Court must in order to reverse not merely entertain doubts whether the decision below is right but be convinced that it is wrong. In this case the learned trial judge accepted the evidence of Atun, the prosecution witness, whom he found to be a consistent witness unshaken by very severe cross-examination and the Appeal Court could find no reason to interfere with his assessment;

(8) the learned trial judge in this case was right in rejecting the application to impeach Atun as there was no basis therefore. There must be some material contradiction or other circumstances unexplained by the witness in the first instance before counsel can move to seek to impeach his credit. A mere hunch will not suffice;

(9) the order made by the learned trial judge in impeaching the credit of the witness Abdullah bin Ambek and denying the right to counsel for all the accused to cross-examine him was clearly wrong. When a witness’s credit is sought to be impugned under the provisions of ss 145 and 195(c) of the Evidence Act his credit stands to be assessed as a whole with the rest of the evidence at the appropriate stage, that is to say at the close of the case for the prosecution or for the defence as the case may be.

No immediate order of a summary nature can or should be made as was done in this case and the right of cross-examination or re-examination according to the circumstances should not be denied as it might well be that in the exercise of such right his credit might be repaired, restored or re-established. This was all the more pertinent in this case as Abdullah bin Ambek had himself raised the issue of the voluntariness of the statement he made to the police. In view however, of the overall strength of the other evidence against the first appellant no substantial miscarriage of justice had been occasioned on this count and the Appellate Court applied the proviso to s 60(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act, 1964;

(10) there was in the circumstances in this case no gap regarding the handing over by and taking possession of the pistol and the evidence clearly showed that this was the pistol owned by the first appellant. The prosecution in this case has established that the first appellant was in possession, custody and control of the pistol at the material time stated in the charge and the learned judge who saw and heard the expert witness, Gee, accepted him as an expert after a considered assessment of his evidence and there was no reason or justification whatsoever to dissent from his conclusion;

(11) in this case the chain of evidence with regard to the recovery of the bullets right up to their subsequent production in court during the trial was complete and there can therefore be no doubt that the exhibits produced in court were the same ones examined by Gee;

(12) where a firearms expert had made the necessary tests and there was no reason for distrusting his opinion which in fact the court had accepted, there could be no room for thinking in the circumstances established that anyone else other than the accused might have shot the deceased. In the premises and in the light of the evidence adduced by the prosecution that the pistol from which the fatal shots were fired belonged to and was in the possession, custody and control of the first appellant at the material time, the facts proved at the close of the prosecution case point to one and only one conclusion, that it was the first appellant who fired the fatal shots that killed the deceased. The learned judge therefore correctly concluded that the prosecution had established a case against him requiring him to enter on his defence;

(13) the burden of proving an alibi lies on the accused setting up the defence but even so the burden of proof as to the guilt of the accused always remains on the prosecution irrespective of whether or not the accused had made a plausible defence;

(14) the learned judge in this case considered the evidence adduced in some detail and on his assessment and for the reasons he gave held that the defence was unsubstantiated. This was essentially a question of fact which turned primarily on the credibility of witnesses and was primarily a matter for the trial judge;

(15) the learned trial judge who saw and heard the witness, Fassnacht, called for the defence, did not accept him as an expert and the Appellate Court saw no reason to interfere with the doubt he had expressed as to the witness’s standing as an expert for the reason he had given;

(16) in all the circumstances, the learned judge found that the evidence adduced by and for the first appellant in his defence had not succeeded in creating any doubt on the truth of the case for the prosecution and the Appellate Court concurred with his finding;

(17) there was no justification in this case for the vituperative nature of the language in which the petition of appeal by the first appellant had been couched and the contumelious suggestions that had been put forward in the address of counsel to the court which had dragged the learned judge into the arena of conflict and subjected him to a personal attack with a virtual suggestion of complicity on his part. The line taken was ill-chosen, mischievous and contemptuous in the circumstances;

(18) the appellants had not been denied a fair trial and the remarks that were subject to attack though perhaps injudicious, were bereft of any sinister connotation against the background in which they were made, and could not and did not affect the proceedings or cause in any way any miscarriage of justice.

Bidang kuasa tempatan

1) TENGKU ABDUL MUIZ SHAH & ORS v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [1983] 1 MLJ 422

Facts:
This is an application by the appellants for a transfer of a criminal case pending in the Johore Baru Magistrate’s Court to the Magistrate’s Court, Kuala Lumpur. The respondent objected to the said application on two grounds, viz., that the Hugh Court at Kuala Lumpur has no jurisdiction to hear the application, and even if it has, the High Court is still not empowered under s 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code to make an order for transfer.

Holdings:

Held:

(1) since the offence was alleged to have been committed at Johore Baru within the territorial jurisdiction of the Johore Baru Magistrate’s Court, and the High Court at Johore Baru has the local jurisdiction for the State of Johore, it follows that the Johore Baru High Court is the court of competent jurisdiction to hear this application;

(2) the present application should therefor be filed before the High Court in Johore Baru and it will be in the power of that court, if it so decides, to transfer the case to Kuala Lumpur Magistrate’s Court.

2) PUBLIC PROSECUTOR v RAJAPPAN [1986] 1 MLJ 152

Facts:

In this case the respondent was married according to Hindu Custom in India in 1947 to the complainant, Pelaniyammal. In 1954 the respondent, complainant and their children migrated to Malaysia. Their marriage was subsequently registered with the Registrar of Marriages, Malaysia. In March 1984 the respondent married one Saraswawthi in India and brought her back to Malaysia. The respondent was charged in the Magistrate’s Court in Klang for an offence under s 494 of the Penal Code. The learned magistrate refused to hear the case on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to do so.

The Public Prosecutor thereupon applied to the High Court under s 127(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code to determine whether the Magistrate’s Court had jurisdiction to hear and try the case. The learned Judge of the High Court held that the courts in Malaysia have no jurisdiction to try proceedings for bigamy committed outside the limits of Malaysia. He also held that it is not an offence if the second marriage takes place outside Malaysia — see [1985] 2 MLJ 231.

The Public Prosecutor referred the following questions for the determination of the Supreme Court —

(a) whether or not in law a person who is domiciled in Malaysia and marries again during the lifetime of his or her husband or wife at a place outside Malaysia and thereafter returns to Malaysia with the second spouse has committed an offence punishable under s 494 of the Penal Code (FMS Cap 45); and

(b) if the answer to question (a) is in the affirmative, then whether or not in law a Magistrate’s Court has jurisdiction to try such person for an offence punishable under s 494 of the Penal Code (FMS Cap 45).
Holdings:

Held:
(1) a bigamous marriage committed abroad by a Malaysian citizen or a permanent resident, notwithstanding such marriage is in contravention of s 5(1) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, is not an offence punishable under s 494 of the Penal Code. Section 7 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, 1976 does not make the offence under s 494 of the Penal Code an extra-territorial offence. The offence under s 494 of the Penal Code is not extra-territorial and it could not be made extra-territorial by reason of ss 5, 6 and 7 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, 1976. The answer to question (a) is therefore in the negative;

(2) even assuming that, a bigamy committed outside Malaysia is an offence punishable under the Penal Code, in the absence of any statutory provision conferring jurisdiction on the court of the area where the offender is found no magistrate court can have jurisdiction to try or to inquire into the offence. There has to be a statutory provision to fix the venue of the trial and thus give jurisdiction to the court where the trial is to be held. In the absence of any such statutory provision the answer to question (b) is also in the negative;

3) PUBLIC PROSECUTOR V HENRY TAYE JOHNSON [1995] 1 MLJ 146

Facts:

Three charges were brought against the respondent, a national of Nigeria, for cheating by personation. The offences in question were alleged to have taken place in the air, over international waters, aboard an aircraft of Royal Brunei Airlines. The public prosecutor appealed against the ruling of the judge in the intermediate court that she lacked jurisdiction to entertain the three charges.

Holdings:

Held, allowing the appeal:

The First Schedule to the Tokyo Convention Act 1967 (Overseas Territories) Order 1968 (‘the Order’) provides that for the purpose of juridiction, any offence under the law in force in the ‘territory’ committed on board a British-controlled aircraft in flight is deemed to have been committed in the ‘territory’ and that the consent of a competent authority of the ‘territory’ is required before any proceedings may be instituted against an offender. By virtue of s 2 of the Air Navigation Act (Cap 113), Brunei is a ‘territory’ in the context and by para 7 of the Order, a British-controlled aircraft means an aircraft registered in the UK or in any ‘territory’. Therefore, subject to proof that the aircraft was registered in Brunei and that the Attorney General, as the competent authority, had signified his consent to the prosecution, the intermediate court had jurisdiction to entertain the three charges in question.

4) DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS V DOOT AND OTHERS ,HOUSE OF LORDS ,[1973] AC 807, [1973] 1 All ER 940, [1973] 2 WLR 532, 57 Cr App Rep 600, 137 JP 375 .
[ 5 warga Amerika dituduh bersubahat mengimpot ganja tanpa lessen ke England. Pejanjian/pakatan jahat telah dibuat diluar England iaitu samada Belgium atau Morocco. Dipertikaikan bahawa mahkamah England tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk membicara kes pakatan jahat. Diputuskan Mahkamah England mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk membicarakan perbuatan salah yang dilakukan di England walaupun perjanjanjian untuk melakukannya dibuat sepenohnya atau sebahagiannya sahaja di England dan pakatan jahat masih berlaku sehingga perbuatan tersebut selesai atau diberhentikan ]

Criminal law - Jurisdiction - Conspiracy - Agreement made by parties abroad - Agreement to perform acts in England - Acts unlawful under English law - Acts performed in England in pursuance of agreement - Whether English court having jurisdiction to try charge of conspiracy.
The five respondents, all American citizens, were parties to an agreement made either in Belgium or Morocco to import cannabis resin into England with the object of re-exporting it from there to the United States. No part of the agreement was made in England. By s 2 a of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1965 it was unlawful to import cannabis resin into the United Kingdom without a licence. The respondents had no licence. They concealed the cannabis resin in three separate vans which were then shipped to England. The cannabis was discovered by customs officers in one of the vans when it arrived at Southampton; the other vans were subsequently traced and the cannabis found in them.

The respondents were convicted, inter alia, of conspiracy to import dangerous drugs, the particulars of the offence alleging that between certain dates 'in Hampshire and elsewhere' they had conspired together 'fraudulenty to evade the prohibition imposed by the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1965, on the importation of a dangerous drug, namely cannabis resin, into the United Kingdom'. On appeal against conviction on the conspiracy count the Court of Appeal b quashed the conviction holding that the English courts had no jurisdiction to try the offence charged since the essence of the offence was the agreement between the respondents to do the unlawful act, the offence was complete when the agreement had been made, and the agreement had been made abroad. The Crown appealed.
a Section 2 is set out at p 954 c, post
b [1972] 2 All ER 1046

HEADNOTE:
Held - The appeal would be allowed and the conviction restored. An agreement made outside the jurisdiction of the English courts to commit an unlawful act within the jurisdiction was a conspiracy which could be tried in England if the agreement was subsequently performed, wholly or in part, in England. Although the crime of conspiracy was complete once the agreement had been made, nevertheless, the conspiratorial agreement remained in being until terminated by completion of its performance or by abandonment; accordingly where acts were committed in England in performance of the agreement that would suffice to show the existence of a conspiracy within the jurisdiction triable by the English courts. It followed that the crime of conspiracy had been committed by the respondents in England (see p 942 g, p 943 j, p 947 f and j to p 948 b, p 949 a e and f, p 951 c to h, p 954 a and p 958 c to e, post). In any event (per Lord Salmon), having regard to the special nature of the offence, a conspiracy to commit a crime in England was an offence against the common law even when entered into abroad,at least when acts in furtherance of the conspiracy were done in England; a conspiracy was equally a threat to the Queen's peace whether hatched in England or abroad (see p 956 c and f to h and p 957 j to p 958 a, post).

R v Brisac (1803) 4 East 164 applied.
Decision of the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, sub nom R v Doot [1972] 2 All ER 1046 reversed.

NOTES:

For the limits of criminal jurisdiction, see 10 Halsbury's Laws (3rd Edn) 316-319, paras 577-581, and for cases on the subject, see 14 Digest (Repl) 145-149, 1074-1123.
For the meaning of conspiracy, see 10 Halsbury's Laws (3rd Edn) 310, 311, para 569, and for cases on the subject, see 14 Digest (Repl) 121-126, 851-877.

5) WONG PANG FING V PUBLIC PROSECUTOR 1997-2 MLJ 151

[ pembicaraan kes didaerah bidang kuasa magistrate lain adalah tidak sah]

Perayu disabitkan atas kesalahan di Mahkamah Majistret di Kuching. Kesalahan dilakukan di Batu 17 Jalan Kuching/Bau, Bau di Negeri Sarawak. Atas rayuan, perayu berhujah bahawa majistret perbicaraan di Kuching mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar kes itu oleh kerana kesalahan dilakukan di Daerah Bau yang mempunyai bangunan mahkamah sendiri.
Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan:

Kesalahan dilakukan di Batu 17 Jalan Kuching/Bau dan Batu 17 adalah dalam rangkuman kawasan pentadbiran Bau. Di bawah jadual kepada Perintah Pentadbiran Kawasan GN 629/49, Daerah Bau dan Kuching adalah dua kawasan pentadbiran Bahagian Satu yang berasingan dan Batu 17 Jalan Kuching/Bau adalah dalam rangkuman kawasan pentadbiran Bau. Majistret perbicaraan di Kuching jelas tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar kes ini di mahkamah majistret di Kuching sebab beliau tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa atas Daerah Bau (lihat ms 153B-C, E).

6) PUBLIC PROSECUTOR v LOH AH HOO [1974] 2 MLJ 216

[tuduhan adalah cuba menyeludup daun terup dari Singggapura ke Malaysia.Tertuduh yang membuat tempahan dan dia yang hadir semasa barangan diisi di Singgapura. Apabila ditahan di Malaysia dia tidak dapat memberi penjelasan kenapa pengiktirafan kastam tidak sama dengan yang dijumpai. Kes nya telah dibuang kerana mahkamah berkata dia tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar. Diputuskan jika perbuatan jenayah berterusan dari luar bidang kuasa dan masuk kedalam bidang kuasa maka orang tersebut layak di bicara di Malaysia]

Facts:
In this case the respondent had been charged with some others for having been knowingly concerned in an attempt at fraudulent evasion of custom duty on 15 cases of playing cards, an offence under s 135(1)(g) of the Customs Act, 1967. The facts showed that the respondent ordered the goods from Naafi, Singapore; he was responsible for the preparation of the customs declaration although it was signed by the Naafi Chief Clerk; he was present at the loading of the goods in Singapore; and he was present when the Customs carried out investigation and could not give an explanation carried out investigation and could not give an explanation as to why the goods were not the same as in the declaration. The Sessions Court acquitted the respondent as it found that the acts of the respondent were not committed within the jurisdiction. The PP appealed.

Holdings:
Held: (1) if a person’s criminal act or responsibility for the criminal act runs from outside jurisdiction to within jurisdiction then he is liable to be tried in Malaysia;
(2) in this case the respondent was responsible for the preparatory acts done in Singapore and those acts culminated within the jurisdiction, when the goods and the declaration for which the respondent was responsible reached the customs at Johore Bahru; therefore he was responsible;
(3) the order of acquittal should therefore be set aside and the respondent called to enter on his defence.